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ABSTRACT
Three approaches to drought management are developed as
generalized mathematical models.
Each model is then applied
to particular locations in Utah using the hydrologic/economic
data from the 1976-77 drought. The modeling approaches include:

0)

A multiple regression approach is used to quantify
the changes in water use achieved by three common
municipal sector rationing policies:
(a)
(b)
(c)

restrictions on time of outdoor use,
price increases, and
mandatory quantity restrictions.

(2)

A model was presented for determining the optimal
long term price schedule for rationing a stochastically variable water supply during summer peak demand
season among groups of municipal water users which have
different demands.

(3)

The third model analyzed various management policies
in terms of their impact on net benefits to the agricultural and municipal sectors.
The model is capable
of modifying policies monthly, based upon the changing hydrologic situation.
It can vary constraints
in a manner that simulates an institutional environment ranging from total freedom of price changes and
water exchanges between sectors to those constraints
existing during the 76-77 drought.

Conclusions include:
l)
Mandatory water use regulations
are much more effect ive than price increases in reducing water
use (at least in a short term drought).
2) A theoretical
analysis of demand and supply functions showed that Salt Lake
City's pricing policy (about $0.25/1000 gallons) is very close
to optimal.
3)
The third model showed that very substantial
losses in consumer surplus in Salt Lake County during the
drought were caused by various institutional restrictions.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION AND SCOPE OF REPORT
Nature of Drought Planning

precipitation totals on record.
The
most serious previous drought in most of
these areas began in 1931 and lasted
until 1934.
The 1976-77 drought lasted
only one year, but an enormous drought
relief effort, for example an $844
million "drought package" on the federal
level, resulted.

It is not possible to plan for
drought in isolation from general water
resources planning.
The object ive of a
rat ional manager of a water supply
system should be to develop facilities
which can be operated to maximize
net benefits from a long term perspective--considering the relative probabililities of wet, average, and drought
years.
An optimal plan may, for example, anticipate a drastic reduction in
production (perhaps to zero) if the cost
of water exceeds its value during an
infrequent drought period. In fact, the
economic justification for new facilities is largely based on reducing the
frequency and severity of these reductions.

Droughts produce the best possible
political environment in which to
finance water development projects.
Often, low interest loans and even
grants become available from federal and
'state sources and convert marginal
projects into profitable projects from
the perspective of the subsidized
users.
Opportunistically, water development interests may best plan for
drought by stock-piling project designs
for financing during the next drought.

Once a drought period has begun
(and more importantly has been recognized as having begun--which is not a
trivial task), water management takes on
a short run operating perspective. One
problem is that of guessing how short
the perspective should be. A reservoir
operator, for example, must decide
whether to release all needed storage
during the current high demand summer
season (thereby assuming the drought
will terminate after one season) or to
carry some over for use during an
extended drought. This decision must be
made in an environment of great uncertainty (no one can predict multi-year
weather patterns) and great pressure
from water users who may already be
s u f fer i ng los s e s .
De a Ii ng wit h t his
uncertainty is the essence of the
drought water management problem.

Drought is difficult to quantify.
One difficulty in determining drought
severity is that it cannot be generalized.
Even in a region where climatic
drought conditions are uniformly serious, the impact upon water users is
highly site specific (Bowles et al.
1980).
Drought severity and vulnerability are functions of many factors
besides the reduction in supply.
Some
users acquire water rights which significantly exceed their average-year
requirement ~n order to insure the
desired supply during a dry year.
Others experience serious shortages.
The type of water source is very important in terms of vulnerability to
drought.
Run-of-river users are impacted first, users with reservoirs may
not be severely impacted unless a
drought becomes lengthy, and groundwater
users are best insulated.

During the winter of 1976-77, many
western areas experienced the lowest
1

Scope of Report

supply.
This model is applied
Salt Lake City municipal system.

A rather extensive literature came
out of the 1976-77 drought, most of
which is historical in nature--how
serious was the drought and how did
water users and various levels of
government respond.
This report
attempts to use such information by
analyzing it on two different levels:

to the

Ch apt e r I V pre sen t s a m u 1 tip 1 e
sector (municipal/industrial and agricultural) model for drought management.
The objective of this chapter is to
compare the economic consequences of the
water management policies followed in
Salt Lake County during the 1976-77
drought to those which are identified by
the model as being socially optimal.
This model has the capability of predicting optimal operating policies
(updated monthly) given historic hydrologic data.

1.
The historic data will be used
to develop a regression model quantifying the effect iveness of various
drought management actions taken.
2.
Two optimization models will
also be developed for analyzing various
drought management concepts (which may
or may not have been used during 197677) .

Organization of Literature Review
The literature on drought related
research and management of the 1976-77
drought will in general be cited and
discussed in Chapters II, III, and IV as
specific topics are covered.
However,
some of the literature which is not
discussed in subsequent chapters will be
described briefly here:

All three models will be applied hypothetically to the 1976-77 situation in
order to provide quantitative guidelines
for future drought management.
The
three models are presented in the next
three chapters.
Chapter II begins with a summary of
actual 1976-77 drought response mechanisms and their use at various levels in
each of several water using sectors in
several states.
A regression analysis
of the effect iveness of such policies
for the municipal sector is presented.
The regression model appears to have a
rational theoretical basis and) therefore, should be useful for future
drought management planning applications.

1.
Weather modification:
A
significant on-going research effort
is being sponsored by the U.S. Bureau
of Reclamation and by NOAA.
This
Southwest Drought Research Program has
produced several reports related to the
technical and economic potential for
reducing drought severity by weather
modification. These include:
Bowles et al., 1981:
Development
of Contingency Plans and Scientific
Background Studies for Applying Weather
Modification during Drought Periods in
Utah.

Chapter III presents a model for
rat ioning of water during drought.
A basic assumption here is that simply
varying the price of water to match
supply and demand is not a viable policy
due to various political/social considerations. Instead, a relatively long
term pricing policy combined with short
term quantity rationing rules is suggested for maximizing social welfare
given the stochastic nature of water

Buller et al., 1981:
Effect of
Weather Modification on Supply of Total
Revenue of a Region.
U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 1981:
Southwest Drought Research Program.

2

indexes drought problems with appropriate programs.

2.
James, D. J. and Wade H.
Andrews, 1978:
Water Conservation
Information Dissemination During the
1977 Drought Emergency.

4.
1978 :

This study was organized during
1977 to provide, for the exchange of
drought information among the respective
states, a forum that could reduce duplication among independent efforts.
The
project collected information on:
a)
water-use conservation practices; b)
water-supplies; c) dealing with special
drought problems.
Types of information
included:
1) research results contributing to dealing more effectively
with emergency drought situations; 2)
research currently underway; 3) brochures or other material prepared for
public distribution; 4) reports of
extension agents or other technical
personnel working with the public to
solve drought problems; and 5) user or
expert statements recommending supplementing or revising any of the above.
This report contains 667 abstracts and a
synthesis of the information obtained on
each topic.

Rosenberg, Norman J. (editod,
North American Droughts.

This collection of seven papers
covers a broad range of drought-related
topics including: a history of American
drought; concepts for measuring severity
and economic, political and social
impacts; and management strategies.
5.
Dyke, Paul T., 1977:
Response Handbook.

Yield

This handbook describes use of
the "National Crop Yield Simulator"
which has been developed by the Economic
Research Service.
The simulator provides a methodology for calculating crop
yield changes as a function of drought
severity in any area of the U.S.
6.
Federal Power CommissionFederal Energy Administration, 1977:
Impacts of the Western Drought on
the Regional Electricity Situation.

3.
Institute for Policy Research,
1977:
Directory of Federal Drought
Assistance.

This report analyzes the sensitivity of western energy costs to
drought conditions.
The critical
proximity of demand to supply capability
during both winter and summer peaks is
described.
Both short- and long-term
recommendations for relieving the
problem during future droughts are
given.

This report, for the Western Region
Drought Action Task Force, describes
more than 40 loan and/or grant type
drought programs which are administered
by 15 agencies. The report also cross-

3

CHAPTER II
SUMMARY OF 1976-77 DROUGHT MANAGEMENT
RESPONSES AND REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF
POLICY EFFECTIVENESS
used to alleviate drought impacts.
Program purposes fall into some combination of efforts to reduce the quantities
of water used, develop new sources of
supply, recycle water for reuse, or
provide financial support to enterprises
suffering drought damage and thereby
assist in their recovery. For the most
part, mitigation programs are government
efforts to influence water users,
although local governments in particular
may construct facilities on their own
initiative.
The princ ipal mechanisms
used to lessen drought impacts are 1)
information programs to increase awareness of the drought, encourage conservation, and describe ways of saving
water; 2) price changes to make high
volume uses less economical; 3) taxes,
grants, and loans to encourage specific
activities (water system leakage repair,
well-drilling),
discourage
"wasteful"
activities, or assist in recovering from
drought damage; 4) administrative
allocations such as rationing programs
and exchange arrangements; and 5) other
regulations (new hook-up restrictions,
plumbing code changes).

Drought Impact Response
in 1976-77
A fairly large literature on the
1976-77 drought provides substantial
information on the techniques used to
mitigate drought impacts.
The present
need is to integrate the descriptive
information on programs and effects in a
variety of communities with a model that
contributes to an overall understanding
that can contribute to more effective
program design for future droughts. The
report attempts to do so by beginning
with the conceptual model of Figure 1.
The five traditional water use
sectors shown in the upper left corner
of Figure 1 are natural choices for
grouping drought program impacts.
They
tend to be institutionally distinct
and coherent interest groups capable of
mobilizing political support for programs they favo~ at national, state, and
local levels.
Consequently, they are
typically identified as the target
group of public policy. In the present
discussion, emphasis is placed on the
municipal, domestic, and agricultural
sectors because the drought experiences
of the other three are difficult to
generalize or were not the object of
extensive mitigation efforts.

There is a tendency to evaluate
program effectiveness in terms of the
achievement of program goals.
Ideally,
evaluation should balance program
accomplishments against the costs of
achieving them, since achieving program
goals may cost more than is warranted by
the results.
Practically, however, it
is di fficul t to compare money spent
on drought relief with the benefits
achieved.
The benefit s are widely dispersed and often d i fficul t to measure.

Drought mit igation initiatives can
be taken at the federal, state, or local
level of government or by individual
water users for their own purposes. The
programs are characterized by a fairly
limited set of alternatives, based on
the program purposes and the mechanisms
5

Estimation is further complicated from a
national economic efficiency perspective
because of distortions produced by
taxing people with sufficient water to
subsidize drought victims. From a local
perspective, most drought program money

is often capital used to increase water
supplies during future shortages whose
magnitudes and timing are difficult to
predict in even a probabilist ic sense.
Undoubtedly, the difficulty of measuring
the net benefits from drought relief

I MITIGATION

WATER USE SECTOR

LEVEL

Municipal/domestic
IFederal
Industrial
~1--------------~l~State
Agriculture
I
Local
Wastewater
Other
Recreation/Environment I
1------------~I-----------4
J

.,
I

PROGRAM DESIGN

MITIGATION EFFECTIVENESS

PURPOSES
Direct:
Reduction in use
Reduce use
New supplies
Augment supply
Amount recycled
Compensated damages
~.- Recycle
Damage recovery
Ul t ima te:
Damage prevented
Unit cost of new supply/
reduction in use
Long term vs short term

MECHANISMS
Facilities construction
Information/persuasion
Price
Tax, Grants, Loans
Administrative allocation
Regulation

CONSTRAINTS AND SIDE EFFECTS
User discretion and incentives
Revenue impacts
Distributive impacts
Timing
Administrative capacity
Etc.

Figure 1.

Drought impact mitigation program cycle.
6

programs is a strong reason for so few
evaluations.

implemented in different parts of the
state (Hughes et al. 1978). These were
higher prices, mandatory maximum use
restr tions, and restrictions on times
of outdoor watering.
The purpose of
this chapter is to evaluate the effectiveness of these various policies in
reducing water use in the short run.

One format for organizing drought
experiences is through a tabular display
structured according to the schematic of
Figure 1. Water use sectors provide the
primary divisions and can be subdivided
by the government level initiating the
program.
Entries are made by purpose
and mechanism,
constraints and side
effects, and effectiveness, and then
cited by a source citation.
Such a
tabular display of information on the
1976-77 drought is given in the Appendix.

Policies
Among the three major rationing
policies implemented during the drought
period in Utah, the most common was the
restriction of watering time for outdoor
use.
Of the 33 systems for which
information was available, 24 imposed
time restrictions.
Total hours allowed
for outdoor watering in a week ranged
between 0 and 105 hours.
Nine systems
implemented price changes, and five
systems imposed mandatory quantity
restrictions.
There were three systems
that had price changes as we 11 as time
restrictions.
Four systems had both
time restrictions and mandatory quantity
restrictions.
Price increases ranged
from $0.03 to $1.25 per 1000 gallons (10
percent to 500 percent).
The quantity
restrict ions ranged from 36,000 gallons
per connection to 6000 gallons per
connection per month. The distributions
of normal (average for years 1973-75)
water use per capita and per connection
for the 33 communities are shown in
Figures 2 and 3.
The water use reductions achieved during the drought are
shown in Figure 4.
The mean reduction
was 156 gallons per connection.
The
standard deviation was 214. Although 27
systems reported a reduction in water
use, six systems had an increase. This
study attempts to quantify the water use
reductions associated with different
policies and thereby establish the
relative effectiveness of each of the
rationing devices through a crosssectional analysis using a multiple
regression model.
To formulate an
appropriate model, it ~s important to
understand the mechanisms whereby the
different policies affected water
use.

An Analysis of Drought Policy
Effectiveness in the
Municipal Sector
Introduction
Many municipal water supply systems
in Utah (particularly the larger urban
systems) depend largely upon surface
water sources.
In 1976-77, the belownormal precipitation during the winter
and the resulting low spring runoff adversely affected surface water
availability.
Because of time and
financial constraints, the options for
augmenting supplies by developing
groundwater or constructing facilities
for importing water from other areas.
we r e not f e as i b 1 e .
Lac k 0 f 1 a r g e
storage facilities and the concern
that the drought might continue into the
next year prompted municipalities to
ration available supplies.
Decisions as to whether to impose
rationing mechanisms and the form
and the extent to which to impose them
depended largely on the municipality's
perception of the drought severity as
well as its perception of the suitability and effectiveness of the various
rationing devices for the speci fic
system.
Three major categories of
policies for restricting water use, with
several variants of each category, were

7
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Water use reductions.
water consumption, and c) an increase in
the progressivity of the multiple block
rates.

Changes in Prices
The price structure for most of the
municipalities included a fixed monthly
charge for a connection.
This monthly
charge allowed the users to consume up
to a specified number of gallons with no
additional charge. The minimum monthly
charge varied from $2 to $11, and the
quantity allowance varied from 3,000 to
12,000 gallons.
In addition, there was
a price for water consumption in excess
of the allowance.
Generally, the
additional price ranged from $0.10 to
$0.30 per thousand gallons. Some of the
systems reported increasing multiple
block rate structures and a couple of
systems had declining multiple block
rate structures. Two systems had a flat
rate per connection with no variable
charges based on the quantity of water
consumed.

The three cases are illustrated
in Figure 5.
In Figure Sa, D represents the demand for water.
When the
minimum charge is raised or the quantity
entitlement corresponding to this
minimum charge is reduced (from Q* to
Q*'), the demand D will shift to D'
due to an income effe~t (normally small)
causing a change in quantity consumed
In Figure 5b, the price
from Q to QI •
is changed from P to p'. In Figure 5c,
the demand curves for two users, Dl and
D2, are shown each facing a different
price PI and P2 respectively.
When
their prices are increased to PI' and
P2', their quantity demanded falls
from Ql and Q2 to Ql' and Q2' respectively.

Price changes during drought
inc luded a) an increase in the minimum
charge (either directly or by decreasing
the quantity that could be used without
increasing the charge), b) an increase
in the price associated with additional

In case (a), the cost of the
intramarginal units increases with no
change in the price of the marginal
units. If the income effects are small,
such changes will have negligible effect
on water consumption. In case (b), the
9
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Effect of pr1ce changes on water use.

quantity consumed will change by an
amount determined by the price elasticity of demand for water and the change
in the price. In case (c), the costs of
both the intramarginal units as well as
the marginal units will increase.
As
under the assumption that the income
elasticity of demand for water is small,
the effect on marginal units can be
calculated as for case (b).
However,
there are additional complications in
measuring price changes in this case due
to the mUltiple block rates.
The price
changes for each blbck could be different.
In order to measure the effective
price change, one must know the demand
distribution.
Since such information
was not available to this study, the

price change corresponding to the
average consumption block was taken to
represent the effective price change.
Time Restrictions
The most common type of time
restriction imposed on outdoor water
use was to allow a household to water
only on particular days.
Usually the
restrictions specified the hours for
lawn watering, presumably to maintain
adequate pressure for fire hydrants.
The total hours in a week during which
water use was restricted ranged from 4
to 83 in the sample.
Many systems
imposed the time restrictions on a
voluntary basis.
Some cities, however,

10

passed an ordinance prohibiting water
use for certain times, thus making the
restrictions mandatory.
Because no
special enforcement effort was made in
the mandatory cases, no attempt was made
to distinguish between the voluntary and
mandatory restrictions in the analysis.
The total hours of restrictions were
computed for each of the systems in the
sample.

the initial price P w ' an amount Qo is
used outdoors.
When a time restriction
1.S imposed, the opportunity cost of
labor increases causing the demand for
water Dw to shift to Dw' assuming
water and labor inputs are complementary.
This will cause the supply of
lawn and garden to shi ft from S to S'.
The new quantity
of lawn and garden
is irrigated with qo'.
A reduction of
qo to ,qo' is achieved through this
policy.
However, with "stringent" time
reductions, the individual may not be
able to use the amount of water he
desires.
This situation is also shown
in Figure 6b where the demand shifts to
Dw".
The desired quantity at price
P w is qo".
However, the amount of
water that the user is able to withdraw
from the system is qo* (within the
given time).
The shadow price of water
is Pw* under this scheme for rationing
outdoor water use.

Ao'

The effect of time restrictions on
outdoor use could be analyzed as follows.
A household can be assumed to
produce "lawn and garden" output by combining water, labor and other purchased
inputs. The optimal amount of "lawn and
garden" is determined by the intersection of the demand and the supply
curves.
The supply is the marginal
cost of producing an additional unit
area of "lawn and garden" where water
and household labor are inputs.
The
time restrictions influence the opportunity cost of household labor by
shifting the individual's time schedule
for watering. In the absence of mechanical devices for watering (such as
timers,
automatic lawn sprinklers,
etc.), the changes required 1.n the
time schedule of the homeowner impose
additional costs on his time.
Under
"moderate" time restrictions,
th·is
factor (increased opportunity cost of
his time) may predominate causing the
derived demand for outdoor water use to
shift downward.
Under more "stringent"
time restrictions, the amount of water
deliverable to lawn and garden may be
severely limited, implying a quantity
rationing of outdoor water use.
These concepts are illustrated in
Figure 6.
In Figure 6a, the demand D
and marginal cost S curves for "lawns
and gardens" are shown. The normal area
for lawn and garden Ao is determined by
the intersection of D and S. The demand
curve for water Dw for this area is
shown in Figure 6b as derived from given
prices for all ·inputs such as households, time cost, fertilizer, etc.
At
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While restrictions limiting the
times of watering may not affect all
the households served from a given
system, the number of connections
affected will increase with the hours of
restriction.
Reasons for differential
effects among households include different lot sizes, the shadow prices of
labor. for gardening, and the number of
people in the household.
The effect on
aggregate demand can be illustrated
with the aid of Figure 7.
Let D1 and
D2 represent two household demands, and
let D be the aggregate demand curve.
A
time restriction will shift D1 and
D2 downward and hence the aggregate
demand D downward to D'.
A "severe"
time restriction might impose quantity
rationing on individual 2 but not
individual 1. In this case individual 2
can consume only up to q2* while consumption by individual 1 is determined
by his demand curve.
The aggregate
demand D is further reduced to D".
As the time restriction becomes more
severe, a greater shift in the aggregate
demand can be expected as more households become affected.
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Figure 6a.

Demand and supply for lawn and garden.
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Figure 6b.

Effect of time restrictions on outdoor water use.
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Effect of restricting watering time on aggregate demand.

Mandatory Maximum Use Restrictions

that aggregate demand shifts to the left
as in Figure 7. However, this shift has
to be distinguished from time restrictions in that it reduces both indoor and
outdoor uses whereas for time restrictions, although the total water use
might decrease, the indoor use actually
might increase.

According to this policy for
restricting water use, the maximum
amount of water that can be consumed per
month per connection is limited to a
specified quantity.
The restrictions
per connection ranged from 6,000 gallons
to 36,000 gallons per month. Unlike
time restrictions where only the outdoor
wa ter use is affected, the quant ity
restriction affects both indoor and
outdoor uses.
However, the restriction
allows the household to allocate water
between indoor and outdoor use in any
manner it chooses, while the time
restriction distorts this allocation by
restricting only the outdoor use.

An index was constructed to measure
the quantity restriction.
The need for
an index, instead of using the ration
quantity directly, arises due to systems
that did not have quantity rations.
For these systems, a zero value could
not be used since it would cause numeric
di fficul ties.
The maximum average
monthly use per connection was found to
be approximately 60,000 gallons.
This
figure was used as a restriction for
systems that did not use any quantity
rationing.
The index Q was defined as
the ratio of the ration amount to
60,000.
This measure is 1 for systems
that did not impose rations and between
o and 1 for those that did. The index
falls as the ration quantity decreases.

Quantity rationing does not affect
households that would use less than the
rationed amount anyway.
As the ration
is reduced, more households are constrained.
The economic relationships
through which this scheme affects
aggregate demand are similar to those
for "stringent" time restrictions In
13

Other Restrictions

dx :::

In addition to the above three
policies, many of the water supply
systems implemented other water use
restrictions.
These included prohibition of water use for washing parking
lots, driveways, and sidewalks, and
reductions of water use in city parks.
Quantitative measures of such restrictions were not available, and their
effects were ignored in the analysis.

~
dP + ax dR + ~
ap
aR
aQ

aN dN

+

~~

dL

+

~~f

dR f

dQ

+

+

~~

"I dI
a

+

(3)

dT

In the above expression, it can be
assumed that no changes in I, N, L,
and T are caused by drought conditions.
The changes in the other variables were
taken as their differences between a
predrought period defined as the average
during 1973-1975 and the drought period
taken as the 1977 calendar year.
The
rainfall was included in the model for
the 1977 growing season as an explanatory variable because the average summer
rainfall for most sites in Utah in 1977
was larger than normal (water supply
primarily comes from winter snow) and
could have reduc ed water use.
The
change in use per connection is thus
given by

Model Formulation
An empirical model is needed
to evaluate how various drought policies affected water use.
The logical
starting point is to assume a household
demand function. Several demand studies
(Howe and Linawe aver 1967, Gardner and
Schick 1964, Hansen and Narayanan
1981, Hanke 1970, Young 1973, Hughes
1980) suggest relevant variables as
important in the determination of water
demand.
For example, one might use a
general demand reI ationship 0 f the
form:

dx = ap dP

+

ax
aR dR

ax

+ aQ

dQ

ax

+aaf

dR f
(4)

x = X(P, I, N, L,

Rf, T) .

(1)

where X is the consumption of water per
connection, P is the marginal price, I
is the household income, N is the number
of people in the household, L is the lot
size, Rf is the rainfall and T is the
temperature during the growing season.
In this formulation, the water demand is
determined by household characteristics
Land N, environmental variables Rf
and T, and economic variables P and I.
The drought policy variables then need
to be introduced.
These are the time
restriction R, the quantity restriction
Q, and the changed price.
Now, the
demand X can be written as
X ::: X(P, R, Q, I, N, L, Rf, T).

For small changes, assuming the respective derivatives to remain constant, a
linear model with the stochastic specification can be given by

where € is assumed to be random"disturbance term with zero mean and constant
variance.
Equation 4 can also be
written ln percentage form as

dx
x

(2)

(6)

Since the purpose of the study is to
evaluate drought policies and not to
estimate the demand, one can consider
the total derivative of the above
demand,

"
t s CI, P ' , Cl,R , ,O'.Q , and 0'. Rf '
Th e coe ff 1Clen
represent elasticities or percentage
changes in per connection consumption
per unit percentage ch.ange in the
explanatory variables P, R, Q, and Rf.
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Equation 6 can also be given a stochastic specification like Equation 5
(9)

a' (1 - Q) + a
Q
1
R

The regression results showed the
explanatory power of the equation
to improve greatly, and the coefficients
had the expected signs.

(7)

f

The other coefficients in Equation
5 were also tested to see if they
depended on Xo and N.
In particular,
the following relationships were postulated:

where the base values for Rand Q are
respectively 168 (total hours in a week)
and 1 (systems with no ration quantity).
The procedure followed in assessing
the impacts of the drought measures with
these equations follows immediately
below.
Numerical result s are given in
the next section. First Equations 5 and
6 were estimated using ordinary least
squares for preliminary evaluation of
the model.
The linear form appeared to
provide better explanatory power than
the percentage form. .Therefore, the
linear form was retained for further
analysis.
The assumption that the coefficients (as) are constant may be somewhat
restric tive. For the time restriction,
aR is likely to be related to the
average normal consumption per connection Xo and the number of people in a
household N.
With the same N, the
larger the value of XO, the greater
will be the effect of time restriction.
Similarly, given the same XO, for any
two systems, the system with larger N is
likely to experience a smaller effect on
water use than is the system with
smaller N.
Therefore, it is hypothesized that
N

(8)

Substituting this relationship, Equation
5 becomes

a

Q

= aQ +
0

a Q Xo + a Q N
2
1

• (10)

+ a p Xo + a p N

• (11)

and
ap

=

ap

0

1

2

These relationships were substituted in
Equation 9 one at a time. The criteria
used to judge the explanatory power of
the added variables included i2 (the
value of R2 adjusted for the degrees
of freedom) and the t values for individual coefficients. In both cases, the
value of R declined from that with
Equation 9, and the t statistics for the
three coefficients of Equations 10 and
11 were not significantly different from
zero at 10 percent level. In fact, only
one t value corresponding to the estimate of aPl was greater than 1. The
F statistic was also lower in both cases
compared to Equation 9.
Based on this
analysis, it was concluded that aQ and
ap can be regarded as constants.
Of the 24 systems which had time
restrictions, 9 were voluntary.
While
the other 15
systems made little
enforcement effort, they may have
achieved better compliance because of an
expectation of possible penalty costs.
To examine for significant differences
between these two groups, a test of the
hypothesis that the water use reduction
for the voluntary case is different
15

Model A:

from that for the mandatory case was
proposed.
To do thi s, Equat ion 8 was
rewritten as

(XO-X1) = 281.7 (PI - PO) + 0.598 R
+ 283.2 (l-Q) - 57.3 (RfO-Rfl)

. (2)

.

where D = 1 if voluntary restriction was
imposed and 0 otherwise.
The null
hypothesis could not be rejected if
a RD turned out to be significantly
different from zero. After substituting
Equation 12 into Equation 9, the following equation was reestimated:

+

t values: (1.790)(1.744)(1.723)(-1.833)
R2

= 0.47

R

= 0.40

F(4,29)

=

6.53

Model B:

. 05)

.(13)

E:

(4)

t values: (2.314)(1.510)(3.330)(-0.993)

The aRD estimate proved significant at
the 5 percent level, and the values of
R2, and t indicated that the coefficients were significantly different from
o at the 5 percent level. The numerical
results of the estimated equations
(Equations 5. 6, 9, and 13) and their
implications are discussed below.

R,

R2

=

0.54

R

= 0.48

F(4,29)

= 8.51

In Equation 14, all the individual
coefficients are significantly different
from zero at the 5 percent level, and
the F ratio indicates that the set of
coefficients as a whole is significantly
different for zero at the 5 percent
level.
In Equation 15, the estimated
coefficient of aRf has a low + value
an d the est i mat e d co e f f i c i en t 0 faR
1S significantly different from zero
at only 10 percent level.

Model Results
A statewide water use survey was
made in Utah near the end of 1977
jointly by the Utah Water Research
Laboratory and the Utah League of Cities
and Towns.
A section of the survey
instrument related specifically to the
drought was inc luded (Hansen et al.
1978).
Data from 33 cities were sufficiently complete to be used in the
regression model.
Table 1 contains
these data.
The models in linear and
percentage forms corresponding to
Equations 5 and 6 were estimated by
ordinary least squares.
The estimated
equation and the associated statistics
were:

The results of the two models can
be compared at the mean values of the
explanatory variables.
By taking the
reference value of price P = 0.25/1000
gallons, water use Xo = 1000 gallons per
connection per day, rainfall Rf = 3.5
inches, time restriction R = 125 hours
and the quantity restriction Q = 0.5
(30,000 gallons per month), the coefficients of Models A and B are converted
to examine changes in water use reduction.
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Table 1.
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Regression model data.

System Name

County

Aurora
Fillmore
Heber
Ivins
Kearns
Layton
Lehi
Lindon
Manilla
Pleasant Grove
Provo
Riverton
Salt Lake Co.WCD
So. Davis WID
So. Jordan
So. Salt Lake
Spanish Fork
Springville
Taylor-Bennion
Uintah
Vernal
Washington Terrace
Brigham Ci ty
East Carbon
Hyrum
Jensen WID
Kenilworth
Monticello
North Salt Lake
Orem
Payson
Price
West Bountiful

Sevier
Millard
Wasatch
Washington
Salt Lake
Davis
Utah
Utah
Daggett
Utah
Utah
Salt Lake
Salt Lake
Davis
Salt Lake
Salt Lake
Utah
Utah
Salt Lake
Uinta
Uinta
Weber
Box Elder
Carbon
Cache
Uintah
Carbon
San Juan
Davis
Utah
Utah
Carbon
Davis

Population
1973-75
1977
613
785
1,736
2,726
3,535
3,448
203
331
13 ,473
15,092
17 ,708
19,678
5,688
7,015
2,030
2,514
319
375
6,186
9,077
59,000
67,744
4,900
6,192
17,920
19,950
5,171
6,219
3,823
5,009
8,748
9,197
8,779
9,309
9,887
10,816
16,678
25,452
521
712
12,563
12,472
7,909
8,540
15,367
16,400
2,100
2,200
2,955
3,485
820
571
503
509
1,692
1,900
2,781
3,573
33,801
42,678
6,368
8,200
10,564
11,193
1,945
2,500

Number of Connections
1973-75
1977
189
242
724
913
1,233
1,230
96
157
3,849
4,312
4,184
4,412
1,658
1,852
457
550
184
247
1,868
2,254
10,639
11,218
1,232
1,548
5,973
6,650
1,620
1,762
886
1,165
2,640
2,705
2,545
2,756
2,933
3,209
4,768
7,272
149
203
3,315
3,043
1,911
2,005
3,904
3,964
671
747
946
1,100
143
205
108
109
578
650
624
812
7,898
10,042
2,000
2,300
4,056
4,332
386
615

ter Use
Million gallons/year
1973-75
1977
33
60
284
297
416
554
34
28
693
1,267
1,076
1,227
386
355
183
153
28
48
1,174
765
6,331
6,401
288
244
1,466
1,792
247
246
214
238
1,012
931
681
899
1,728
2,237
1,267
1,276
64
61
1,543
1,380
278
283
1,777
2,207
161
273
524
499
32
37
19
9
195
96
685
480
3,605
3,647
1,028
1,000
834
989
89
99

Table 1
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Cont

Change in
Water Use
(gal/day/
System Name
conn.)
Aurora
-200
Fillmore
184
303
Heber
Ivins
199
Kearns
461
Layton
135
Lehi
112
Lindon
10
Manilla
-109
Pleasant Grove
-303
Provo
67
Riverton
209
217
Salt Lake Co.
WCD
31
So. Davis WID
So. Jordan
233
So. Sa It Lake
-58
Spanish Fork
-160
Springville
614
Taylor-Bennion
255
Uintah
271
33
Vernal
12
Washington
Terrace
Brigham ci ty
320
East Carbon
523
.Hyrum
276
Jensen WID
127
Kenilworth
269
Monticello
523
North Salt Lake -200
Orem
255
Payson
217
Price
140
West Bountiful
190

Price
Change
($/1000
gal)
0
0
0
0.25
0
0.15
0.10

0.05

0.08
0.40
0.03

1. 25

0.27

Percent
Price
Change

Percent
Change
in
Rainfall

Mandatory
Time
Restriction
(hr/wk)
133
0
147
0
164
0
0
0
0
0
144
164
164

Quantity
Restriction
Index

0
0
0
83
0
60
50
0
10
0
0
0
0

Voluntary
Time
Restriction
(hr/wk)
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
96
0
156
0
0
0

0
0
0
0
0.67
0
0
0
0
0
0
2.0
0.67

Change
in
Rainfall
(inches)
-0.24
0.56
-0.43
-0.46
-0.76
0.10
-1.01
0.16
-0.68
-1.01
-1.01
-0.76
-0.76

0
0
0
0
0
0
36
200
0

0
0
164
0
0
0
0
160
0

163
164
0
0
156
164
0
0
158

0
0.67
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

0.10
-0.76
-0.76
0.16
-1.01
-0.76
-0.74
-0.74
-0.35

0.024
-0.210
-0.210
0.049
-0.334
-0.210
-0.261
-0.261
-0.081

16
0
0
0
0
500
0
0
0
0
117

0
0
0
132
0
168
84
63
84
0
0

0
168
84
0
0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0
9.0
0
0
0

-4.80
0.19
-3.82
-0.74
0.19
-0.83
0.10
-1.01

-1.411
0.046
-0.972
-0.261
0.046
-0.149
0.024
-0.334

(I-g)

-0.085
0.166
-0.112
-0.239
-0.210
0.024
-0.334
0.049
-0.178
-0.334
-0.334
-0.210
-0.210

0

0

0.16

0.049

144
164

0

0.19

0.046

0

0.10

0.024

2.201

The result s suggest that at these
reference values, a 1 percent increase
in price will reduce water use by 0.07
to 0.09 percent.
A 1 percent increase
in time restriction (I.68 hours per
week) reduc es wa ter use by 0.064 to
0.075 percent.
A 1 percent increase in
Q (implying a restriction of an additional 3,000 gallons/month from the·
initial 30,000 gallons) will lead to a
0.014 to 0.054 percent reduction in
water use.
If the rainfall during the
growing season exceeds the mean value
by 1 percent, a reduction of 0.1 to
0.2 percent in water use would take
place.
The corresponding water use
reductions in gallons per day per
connection are shown in parentheses in
Table 2.

XO-Xl = 412.1(Pl-PO) + 2.24 R - 1.69 DR

+ 0.00122 XOR + 335.7l(1-Q)

t values: 1.591

CtR '
f

1.754

-2.254

- 0.707 NR + 0.0015 XOR

1.899

Comparison of water use for Models A and B.

Coefficients

CtQ '

F(6,2]) = 6.47

Model D

XO-X1 = 232.5(P1-PO) + 2.57 R - 0.84 NR

CtR'

0.5

The hypothesis, that the water use
reductions in the case of voluntary
time restriction was significantly
different from that with the mandatory
restrict ion, was tested based on Equation 13. The estimated equation and the
associated statistics are provided
below:

Model C

CtP'

=

Except for the price change, all
the coefficients are significant at
the 5 percent level.
The price change
coefficient is significant at the 10
percent level.
The F ratio and the R2
and R values improved significantly.
The price elasticity decreased at
the reference values.
The mandatory
quantity restriction and the rainfall
variable have more pronounced effects on
water use.
The effectiveness of time
restriction is now a function of Xo
and N. At a reference value for N = 3.5
and Xo = 1000, the coefficient of R is
0.85 as compared to 0.598 for Model A.

Due to the lower t values in Model
B for some of the coefficients, Model A
was used as the basis for further
analysis.
Equation 9 was estimated
using ordinary least-squares.
The
result was

Table 2.

R

0.59

-1.726

Reference Values
P

-

R

-

Q

-Rf

=

Model A
Percent (gal/day)

Model B
Percent (gal/day)

0.07

(70)

0.088

(88)

= 125

0.075

(75)

0.0644

(64.4)

0.5

0.014

(14.2)

0.054

(54)

= 3.5

-0.200

0.25
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(200)

-0.107

ClO])

t values:

R2 = 0.69

2.857

1.712

-2.86

2.586

1.945

-1.868

R=

0.6

F(7,26)

-2.1

=

reduct10ns achieved by three efforts of
communities to conserve water.
These
efforts were price increases, time
restrictions on the hours of outdoor
water use, and volume restrictions on
maximum monthly water use. According to
the bes t mode l:

8.19

The coefficients are all significant ly
different from zero at the 5 percent
level.
The F ratio also indicates that
the set of coefficients is signific~ntly
different from zero. The value of Rand
R2 increased from the previous model.
Based on the t value corresponding to
DR, the hypothesis could not be rejected.
The coefficient of DR has
the expected sign.

Model D suggests a price elasticity
of 0.103 at the base values of P =
$0.25/1000 gallon and Xo = 1000 gallons
per day.
The coefficient of time
restriction at the reference values
is given by 1.27 for mandatory restriction and -0.58 for voluntary restriction. This implies that an average hour
of time restriction per week reduces
water use by 1.27 gallons per day if
mandatory and increases water use by
0.58 gallons per day if voluntary.
Although voluntary restriction increases
use at the base values of Xo and N,
systems with large values of Xo and
small values of N (large initial use and
small families) would experience use
reductions with voluntary restrictions.
In fact, .only three of the nine systems
that had voluntary restriction actually
experienced increased consumption.
One
possible explanation for this effect is
that voluntary restriction may cause
the consumer to expect more stringent
restrictions later in the season and
respond by overwatering.
In any case,
voluntary restriction does not seem
to be an effective tool ~n reducing
water use.

Conclusions
A multiple regression model was
developed to determine the water use

.

.

1.
A 1 percent ~ncrease ~n pr~ce
leads to one tenth of a percent decrease
~n the quantity consumed.
2.
The effectiveness of time
restrictions on outdoor use depends
upon the "normal" water use level, the
number of people in the household, and
whether or not t he res tr ic t ion was
imposed on a voluntary or mandatory
basis.
An increase in the mandatory
time restriction of 1 hour per week
decreases total water use by 1.27
gallons per day if the average water use
is 1000 gallons per day for an average
connection serving 3.5 people.
For
systems wi th higher use leve Is and
fewer people per connect ion, the water
use reduction will be greater.
For the
case of voluntary restriction, water use
sometimes increased, particularly for
systems with smaller use levels and
higher number of people per connection.
3.
For every 1000 gallon reduction in maximum monthly water use, a
reduction of 4.46 gallons per day in
use was observed.
From an economic efficiency point
of view, mandatory restrictions on the
times of outdoor watering are a poor
choice of policy because they affect
only one type of use.
Unless enforcement costs are significantly higher or
fewer marginal uses occur indoors,
manda tory quanti t y res t ric t ions are
better since they allow households
to allocate water between outdoor and
indoor uses in any way they choose.
They do not distort the marginal rate of
substitution between indoor and outdoor
water uses.
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If distributional
considerations
are not important, the third method,
price change, would be a still better
alternative since the marginal rate of
substitution between water and all other
goods used by households would remain
equal.
However, from the model, it
appears that the short-run price elasticity is small and it might take a
large increase in price to accomplish a
reasonable reduction in use.
A 20

percent reduction in water use would
require more than doubling the price.
Voluntary periods for outdoor
watering was ineffective in reducing
water use. On the other hand, there was
little cost; and the program may be a
reasonable alternative for areas with
high use levels and few users per
connection.
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CHAPTER III
USE OF RATIONING IN THE MANAGEMENT OF RESIDENTIAL
WATER SYSTEMS WITH A STOCHASTIC SUPPLY
Introduction

exhausted.
This would result in the
optimal distribution of the water
supply but would require complete
and perfect information on the water
market.

Many of the municipal water supply
systems in the western United States
depend largely upon surface water
sources which exhibit substantial
annual variability.
Such communities
are often reluctant to vary the price of
water as a means of coping with supply
variability. This may be due to lags in
the bureaucratic process required for
price determination, desire for price
stability, or concern for equity.
Perhaps the National Water Commission
(1973, p. 251) was considering these
factors When it recommended:

Because this is unrealistic,
economists are more likely to recommend
taking advantage of the market by
issuing resalable ration coupons to
water users (Layard and Walters, pp.
200-201).
The method eliminates the
welfare losses associated with more
rigid rationing, but the administrative
costs of issuing ration coupons and
implement ing the trans fer of wa ter
entitlements from one household to
another may be more costly than the
welfare gains achieved.

(Water) Users should ••• be
reasonably certain as to the
pricing situation they face.
This means that •.. overall
price structure should not be
changed frequently.
The
uncertainty to be avoided is
frequent or abrupt c hanges-more often than every three to
five years--i n the overall
price structure.

A more common rat ioning scheme is
to set different quotas for different
households based upon their past water
consumption during normal years.
If
consumers have advance knowl edge that
this method of rationing will be implemented at times of water shortage, they
would tend to shi ft their demand functions. That is, they would consume more
water when it is plentiful, in order to
avoid being penalized during shortages
for past low consumption levels.

However, short-run price rigidity
leads to shortages whenever the available water is less than the total
quantity demanded at current prices.
The traditional mechanism to deal with
these shortages is to implement some
form of rationing.

From an administrative point of
view, the least costly method of
rationing seems to be to set equal
quotas for all users.
In this case,
there would be no need for information
on marginal valuations of water to
different users, and the cost of collecting this information would be
eliminated.
Furthermore, the water

If the demand curves for water by
each individual were known, the ration
allotments could be set to make the
marginal values equal to all users at
the point where the water supply is
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users could remain anonymous to the
water supply authorities. However, this
method of rationing results in unequal
marginal rates of substitution for water
among users and between water and other
goods.

were subjected to some form of mandatory
curtailment of water use during the
height of the drought.
These mandatory
curtailments generally took one of
two forms:
1) a percentage reduction
from the previous year's use or 2) a
quota expressed in gallons per day per
person or per household.
Nearly all
Californians engaged to some degree in
water conservation programs (Department
of Water Resources/State of California
1978).

The most common means of enforcing
rationing is by imposing penalties on
violators.
This practice was implemented in California during the drought
of 1976-77.
In describing the East Bay
Municipal Utility District conservation
program, Harnet (1978) reports:

The record suggests that, under
conditions of water shortage, most water
supply authorities prefer to set an
equal ration quota for each household.
However, the ration allotments are often
set arbitrarily, and the long-run water
prices are not generally consistent with
the rationing scheme imposed during
shortages.

To provide incentive for
customers to reduce consumption .•• excess use charges
were established for customers
exceeding their allotment.
Additional provisions included
installation of flow restrictors in meters of domestic
customers who persisted in
using more than their allotments....
possible discontinuance of service in cases
of c ont inued ext reme abuse
also was authorized.

Previous Research
A number of researchers have
examined the effect of stochastic
supplies on water management. Turnovsky
(1969) analyzed the effects of stochastic water supply on consumer demand by
using supply variation as an argument of
the demand function.
For water pricing
and capacity expansion decisions with
stochastic water supply conditions, Crew
and Roberts (1970) used maximization of
expected we lfare gain as the planning
criterion.
They assume that when there
is a water shortage, consumers are
ranked according to their willingness to
pay, even though they all pay the same
price.

Summary of Drought Experience
Many western water utilities were
faced with reduced water supplies
during the 1976-77 water year.
Of the
154 Utah municipal water systems surveyed, approximately 50 percent restricted water usage (Hughes et al.
1978).
Half of the restrictions were
mandatory and the other half were
voluntary.
The forms of restrictions
included limitations of water use by
both days of the week and hours of the
day and prohibition of certain outdoor
water uses.
About 36 percent of the
systems increased water prices.
However, only a third of these systems
admitted to increasing the price due
to reduced water supply conditions.

There ~s a large body of literature
on rationing electricity when the peak
demand exceeds the existing capacity of
electric utilities.
Brown and Johnson
(1969) assumed that capacity could be
costlessly allocated among consumers on
the basis of greatest willingness to
pay.
Subsequent authors (Carl ton 1977,
Crew and K1eindorfer 1978, Meyer 1975,
Sherman and Visscher 1978) modified the
assumptions about the way capacity is
rationed and changed the way that

In California, it was estimated
that over 150 communities, serving
about one-third of all Californians,
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uncertainty enters the demand function.
They added new constraints to the
problem and derived solutions for an
optimal price which is greater than the
marginal operating costs (Panzar and
Sibley 1978).
The common theme of
this literature is that the need for
rationing stems from the rigid price and
stochastic demand experienced by the
elec tric ut i l i ties, rather than the
stochastic supply serving the relatively
stable demand conditions experienced by
water utilit s and thus the focus of
the study.
Moreover, the electric
utility studies do not address the
issue of long run price determination
consistent with equal quota rationing.

n'1
n

of consumers

D'1

identical inverse demand
funct ion of each consumer in
group i.

p.*
1

optimal long-run price for
group 1.

Q*

total quantity
demanded

of

water

m

In this study, economically e fficient long run prices (kept rigid in the
short run) are derived consistently with
quantitative rationing in the context of
a stochastic water supply.
The derivation follows.

Q* =
MCCQ)
Qs

Assume that there are two groups of
consumers, with n1 identical members
in the first and n2 ident ical members
in the second group. Let their individual inverse demand functions be D1 and
D2, respectively.
At long run price(s)
(yet unknown), quantities of water
demanded by each member of the first and
second groups are q1 * and q2 * , respectively.
Further assume that q1*(P*)
< q2*(P*). The total ~uantitl of
water demanded is Q* = n1ql + n2q2 •

f(Qs)

L

i=l
marginal cost of supplying
water.
random variab Ie,
water supply.

availab Ie

probability density function
of Qs '
ration quota for each consumer.

QR

total quantity of water demanded at times of rationing.

The higher the price, the less
would be the total quantity of water
demanded, and the lower would be the
probability that the available water
supply, which is stochastic, falls short
of the total quantity demanded at any
given time, and the lower would be the
probability of the need for resorting to
rationing.

The available water supply is a
random variable represented by Qs '
Let the probability density function of
Qs be f(Qs)'
Whenever Qs falls short
of the total demand Q* , a quota qr'
is set for all consumers.

1

total number
n
n = E ni·
i=l

quantity of water demanded by
each consumer of group i at
. Pi* .
pr1ce

Theoretical Model: Benefit
Function Under Rationing

The following notations
throughout this study:

number of consumers in group
1.

are used
On the other hand, the higher the
price of water, the lower would be the
total quantity demanded. Therefore, the
probability that available water supply

number of consumer groups i =
1 , 2, ..• , m.
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will exceed the total quantity of water
demanded wi 11 be higher.
Thus, the
probability of foregone consumers' and
producers' surpluses will be relatively
higher.
In order to balance the two effects
and arrive at optimal prices, the
procedure is to maximize the sum of the
expected producers' and consumers'
surpluses.
Because of the small share
of a typical household budget spent on
water, the income effect of a price
change for water is neglected.
The
expec ted surplus can be de fined for a
situation where there are two groups of
consumers by the sum of Equations 18,
19, and 20 (considering progressively
more severe relationships between supply
and demand as the supply varies over
time) below:

+

qr

n

J

IQr

(D )dQ 2

2

o

MC(Q) dQ

f(Q )dQ
s
s

0
• (18)

+

f
f
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jqt
n

jqz*

(Dl)dQ

l

+ nZ

0

Q*

(D )dQ
2

0

Q*

MC(Q) dQ

f(Q )dQ

s

s

• (20)

o

Equation'18 is the expected surplus
when 0 i Qs i (nl + n2) ql* or the case
where the ration allotment is binding
for both groups of consumers.
E~uation
19 pertains when (nl + n2) q1
-< Qs
_< Q~ or the drought is not severe enough
for the ration allotment to be binding
for consumers in the first group, but it
is binding for consumers in the second
group.
Equation 20 represents the
expected surplus when the, available
water supply exceeds the total quantity
of water demanded, Q*. Therefore, there
is no need for rationing,
Two different methods of determining the uniform ration quota qr are
explained below.
In one scheme, qr
is determined by dividing available
water supply by the total number of
consumers.
Under this scheme some of
the available water may not be used even
though rationing is restricting use. In
scheme II, qr is varied as the available water supply falls so that the
water supply is always exhausted during
rationing.
Rationing Scheme I

J
qr

n

2

JQr

(D )dQ 2

o

In this case, the ration quota is
determined by the rule qr = Qs/(nl +
n 2) .
Th e a va i lab lew ate r sup ply i s
divided by the total number of households, irrespective of the level of
Qs '
When 0
Qs
(nl + n2)ql *, this
ration quota will be binding for consumers in both groups, because 0 <

MC(Q) dQ

f(Q )dQ
s
s

i

0
• (19)
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i

[Qs/(n1 + n2)] < q1* < q2*'
Therefore,
all of the available water supply Qs
would be exhausted, and Q = Qs '
Howi
ever, when (nl + n2) ql ~ Qs ~ Q*,
the ration quota will not be binding for
consumers in the first group, because
ql* < [Qs/(nl + n2)].
Therefore, the
available water supply Qs will not
be exhausted, and Qr = n1q1 * + n2qr
< Qs'

I

+ nm

To extend this model over a number
of groups of consumers, suppose that
there are m groups of consumers with
individual demand functions of the form
Di, i = 1, 2, 3, . , , ' m.
At Q* each
consuming unit demands qi*(P*), and
the ordering of qi* are such that
ql*(P*)

qr

I

(D )dQ

m

Qr
MC(Q)dQ f(Q )dQ
s
s

o.

o

. (22)

< q2*(P*) < q3*(P*) <..... .
<

qm*(P*)

Each group has ni consumers.
Define n
n 1 + n 2 + ••• + nm a s the tot a 1
number of households.
The rat ion quota
is set equal to qr = Qs/ n
whenever
Qs falls short of Q*.
With these
assumptions, the expected surplus, ES,
could be defined as the sum of Equations
21 through 24:

=

+ .... + n.

+

J

qr

+ n

J

(D )dQ

m

m

o

+
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••••

I

+ nm

qr

Qr

-

(D )dQ

m

Qr

MC(Q)dQ

f(Q )dQ
s
s

f(Q )dQ

s

. (23)

s

o
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J
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MC(Q)dQ
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I

1
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0

ql(*D )dQ

+

n

Jr.

2

1

f

q2

o

(:2)dQ

+

When nqj *

. . . .. +

f

i

Qs _< Q*

qj: i (Qs/~)
that (Q In) ~ qj .

i

or

(Q* In),

it implies

Upon substituting kj Q* for qj*
above inequality becomes

Q*
MC(Q)dQ

f(Q )dQ
s
s

. (24)
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o
This
by

Equation 21 shows the portion of
the expected surplus when 0 < Qs <
nql *.
The ration quota qr is binding
for consumers in all m groups, because
(Qs/n) i qI* < q2*
< .••. < qm* and
therefore Qr = Qs '
Equation 22 shows
the portion of the expected surplus when
nqI* i Qs i nQ2*'
In this case, rati?n
quota is not binding for consumers ~n
the first group, but it is binding for
consumers in all other groups, because
qI* < (Qs/n) < q2* < ..•• < qm*, and
therefore Qr -;, nIql* + (n2 +
+
Um)qr'

I
n

i

suggests

k

j

= Min

that j

{l -

.s.

*

I

(:: +

;~ + ....

ki >

o}

In order- to exhaust the available
water supply under non-price rationing
(When Qs falls short of Q*), the ration
quota has to be varied with Qs '
When
o < Qs < (ni + n2) ql*' then qr =
Qs 7(nl
n2) would be binding for
consumers in both groups and therefore
Qs would be exhausted.
When (ni +
n2) qi *
Qs
Q* == *nl qi * + n2q2 * ,
then q
== (Qs - nIql )/n2 would not
r
.
be binding
for consumers ln
t h e f'ust
group, but would be binding for consumers in the second group.
This would
lead to the exhaust ion of availab Ie
water supply, because unlike scheme I,
determination of qr is made based
on the fact that it would not be binding
for consumers of the first group.
Therefore, in this scheme Qr would
al ways be equal to Qs '
The mode I can
be extended to m groups of consumers
under the same assumptions as rationing
scheme 1.

d)

S.1

can be determined

Rationing Scheme II

i

and therefore Qr = nlql + n2q2 + .•. +
n·q·* + (n'+1 + ... + Um)qr'
In order
J find /, the demand functions of
consumers in all m groups are assumed to
be linear and have a common intercept
term, with different slopes.
The
inverse demand functions will be of the
form Pi == a - i3 i q.
Th e qua n tit y
demanded by the ith group consumer is
qi *
ki Q"I( where
==

>

If assumption of equal intercept
terms is relaxed, then discrete approximation will be required.
The problem
can be solved using integer programming
techniques.

<... < qm*

*

>

k ; I
i
inn

+

qj+l *

kj-l

Equation 24 shows the expected
* In t h'~s case,
surplus when Qs > Q.
there is no need for nonprice rationing.

Equation 23 shows the fort ion of
expected surplus when nqj
-Qs
Q*, and therefore the rat~on quota is
not binding for consumers ~n groups I,
2, ••• , j; but it is binding for consumers in groups j + 1, •.. , m; because:

i

the

+ ::)
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.s.

The expected surplus, ES, would be
defined by the sum of Equations 25
through 29:

+ .... + nm
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In Equation 25, when

0

m

.s. Qs i

E

n'~

=

ql*

...

(nl+n2+

i=l
+ Urn) ql*;

the ration quota is set equal to

...... +

n

qr,l
qr m

n

J

m

qm*

and as it is binding for consumers in
the first group, it is also binding
for consumers ~n all groups.

a

Qs

J

.s. ql * < q2* < .••
<

~nm)dQ

and
m

In Equation 26, when
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i . e . , when (nl +

J
q

+ ...... + nm

*

m(n

nz

+

•••

+

the ration quota is set equal to
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The lower and u.fper limits of Qs would
imply that ql
< qr 2 < ·q2* < q3*
.
.
< ... < qm * , so that '
rat~on quota ~s
binding for consumers of all, except the
first group.
30

In Equation 27, when

The lower and upper 1 imi ts of Qs imply
that ql* < q2* < .... < qm-1 * ~ qr m ~
~*. so that the ration quota is binding
only for consumers of the last (mth
group).
Equation 29 shows the expected
surplus when the available water supply
exceeds the total quant it; 0 f wa ter
demanded at optimal price P.
In this
situation, there is no need for resorting to nonprice rationing schemes.

i.e. , when
nlql * + (n2 + n3 +

....

+ Ilm) q2 * ~

Benefit Maximization

Qs ..:5. n 1 ql * + n2q2 * +
(n3 +

.. ,.

The benefit functions for the two
rationing schemes presented above are
highly nonlinear. Maximization of these
funct ions wi thout any constraints would
suggest different prices for di fferent
If the effect of
consumer groups.
different rates on intramarginal units
on demand is negligible (Taylor 1975,
Billings and Agthe 1980), these different prices define a multiple block
rate structure.

+ Ilm) q3 * ,

,.

the ration quota is set equal to

and lower and upper limits of ~s would
imply that q1* < q2*..:5. qr,3 ~ q3 < •...
< qm*. The ration quota would be
binding for consumers of all, except the
first and second groups.

However, by introducing some
constraints to the problem, uniform
pricing schedules could alternatively be
determined.
The necessary constraints
are derived from the individual inverse
demand functions of different groups.
Suppose that the inverse demand functions are linear in the regions of
concern and are of the forms:

In Equation 28, when

m-2
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ni % * + (Ilm-1 + Ilm)

~- t* < Qs
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4

= <X

3

4

In order to have a uniform pricing
schedule, the prices will have to
be made equal in the inverse demand
func t ions, i.e.:

which would yield the following constraints:

The optimal value of the ES corresponding to the constrained problems
would be lower than the solutions to
unconstrained problems.
As a whole, these models define
water shortages as a function of price
and available water supply.
The short
run price rigidity, which is one of the
characteristics of the water market, is
incorporated.
Under the condition of
fixed prices in short run, two methods
of quantity rat ioning are proposed to
deal with water shortages.
Finally,
economically efficient long run prices
which are consistent with these rationing rules are derived.

Department of Public Utilities.
Salt
Lake County is surrounded on three
sides by mountains and Great Salt Lake
on the north.
The Wasatch Range forms
the eastern boundary; the Traverse
Mountains the southern and the Oquirrh
Mountains the western boundary.
The
Jordan River, which has poor quality
water used mainly for industrial and
agricultural purposes, enters the county
below the outlet of Utah Lake and flows
north through Salt Lake County, dividing
it into eastern and western port ions,
and terminates in the Great Salt Lake
(Figure 8).
The streams originating in
the Wasatch Range, which are sources of
high quality water, provide more than 97
percent of the surface water supply
originating in the Salt Lake Valley
drainage area.
The seven major streams
from north to south are City, Red Butte,
Emigration, Parleys, Mill, Big Cottonwood, and Little Cottonwood Creeks.
The streams originating in the Oquirrh
Mountains provide less than 3 percent of
the surface water supply originating in
the Salt Lake Valley drainage area.
Presently, the major source of
imported water into Salt Lake County
is from the Deer Creek Reservoir on the
Provo River.
The Central Utah Project
does not as yet supply any water to Salt
Lake County. The Bonneville Unit, which
is part of the Central Utah Project's
initial phase, will divert Uintah Basin
wa ter (in eastern Utah) to Bonnevi lIe
Basin (north-central Utah).
Of the
100,000 acre-feet of municipal and
industrial water that will be developed,
70,000 acre-feet will be available for
Salt Lake County.

Description of the
Case Study Area

There were nearly 12,000 wells in
the valley registered with the Utah
Division of Water Rights in 1969.
The
majority of the wells are located to the
east of Jordan River where the quality
of the water is generally high.

The model developed in the previous
sect ion was applied to the major water
retailer in Salt Lake County, namely the
Water Department in the Salt Lake City

Over 42 percent of Utah's population resides in Salt Lake County, which
is the pr1mary industrial, political,
and commercial center of the Inter-
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Figure 8.

Salt Lake County.

mountain West.
During the period of
1960 to 1980, the population in Salt
Lake County increased 62 percent, to
620,000, and it is expected to rise to
nearly 1 million by the turn of the
century.

The- current annual municipal water
supply in Salt Lake County under average
precipitation conditions is estimated to
be 185,000 acre-feet.
If this supply
was to remain the same, it is projected
that water consumption would exceed
available supply by 1985 (presumably at
current prices); and by the year 2000,
it would exceed supply by nearly 70,000
acre-feet.
About 40 to 50 percent of
the annual municipal water delivered is
used outdoors for lawns and gardens
(Metropolitan Water District of Salt
Lake City et al. 1982).

Of the 657,700 acre-feet of water
withdrawn during 1980 in Salt Lake
County, 167,700 acre-feet (25.5 percent)
were used for municipal purposes,
161,500 acre-feet (24.5 percent) for
industrial, 294,900 acre-feet (45
percent) for irrigation, and 33,600
acre-feet (5 percent) for rural domestic
and livestock.

The Water Department in the Salt
Lake City Department of Public Utilities
33

(Salt Lake City Water Department) is by
far the biggest municipal water retailer
in Salt Lake County. It delivered more
than 92,000 acre-feet of water to a
population of nearly 370,000 people
during 1979-80 water year (including
daytime work force and tourists).
On
the average, 16.1 percent of it s supplies comes from pumps and artesian
wells, 1.2 percent from springs, and
the rest (83 percent) from surface
source s of wa ter.
Bec ause of th is
large dependency on the stochastically
variable surface supply, the Salt Lake
Ci ty Water Department was found ideal
for this study.
Salt Lake City Water
Department has water rights to City,
Emigration, Parleys, Mill, Big Cottonwood, and Little Cottonwood Creeks. The
details for these water rights were
obtained from Sa I t Lake Ci ty Wa ter
Department.
The water right structure
is quite complicated in terms of the
time, quantity, and the priority components of the water rights.
For
modeling purposes, they were simplified,
based on past use levels from these
streams as shown in Table 3.

Seasonal Analysis
The Salt Lake City Water Department
maintains an excellent data record
on monthly water consumption and sources
of water supply.
Average monthly
water consumptions for the period
1971-1981 were calculated.
The year
1977 was excluded from this ca1culat ion
because of rationing measures that were
imp1 emented for drought mi t iga tion.
These averages are plotted in Figure
9.
Based on these average s and the
seasonal analysis performed by Hansen
and Narayanan (1981), the months of the
year were divided into growing and nongrowing seasons.
May through September
was judged to be the growing season,
whereas October through April was
recognized as the nongrowing season. As
mentioned earlier, about 40 to 50
percent of the annual municipal water
consumption is for outdoor uses.
Since
this outdoor use occurs in the growing
season, water management is more critical for the growing season months than
for the nongrowing season months.
In
other w:>rds, any water shortage would
most probably occur in the growing
season, when the demand for water is
relatively high.

Since Salt Lake City Water Department has primary rights to most of
these creeks (for those that it doesn't
have the primary rights, the share of
primary right holders to streamflow was
not significant), this simplification
seemed to be appropriate and was judged
to show the actual obtainable water from
these creeks.

Table 3.

Based on the data from 1970-1981,
the amount of water withdrawn from each
source and its percentage contribution
to the total water delivered was calculated for the growing season. These
percentages for year 1977 (the drought

Water rights of Salt Lake City Water Department.

Creek

City

Water right
to percentage
of flow

100%

Emigration

50%

Parleys

Mill

Big
Cottonwood

Little
Cottonwood

100%

50%

75%

50%
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year) and their averages for the whole
period are shown in Table 4.

sponding increases in the Little Cottonwood and Deer Creek contributions.

It is interesting to note that
these percentages were not drastically
different during the drought of 1977 as
compared to normal water conditions.
The major differences were a decline in
Parley Creek's contribution and corre-

Demand Estimation
In
retical
needed
users.

order to apply the above theomodel. demand functions are
for several groups of water
Assuming that there are m groups

14,800

14,000

10,000

8,000

6,000

4,000
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Apr

May

Jun

Jul

Aug

I
Growing Season
Figure 9.

Average monthly water consumption (acre-feet).
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Sep
I

Oct

Nov

Dec

Table 4.

Contribution of each source of supply of total water delivered.

Emigration
Creek

Parley's
Creek

Source

City
Creek

Year
1977

8%

1.6%

7%

8.5%

1.8%

13.2%

Big
Cottonwood
Creek

Little
Cottonwood
Creek

Deer
Creek
Reservoir

Pump
Wells

Artesian
Wells

Springs

23%

20%

22%

12%

5%

1.4%

24.2%

17.5%

17.4%

12.8%

3.3%

1.3%

Average
of
w

0'\

1970-81

of consumers and that consumers in any
group have similar demand functions, m
demand functions are needed. There are
no available studies on the distribution
of water demand among consumers within a
community.
However, numerous studies
estimate the aggregate water demand for
communities in the United States.
For
example, Hansen and Narayanan (1981)
estimated the elasticity of demand for
water in Salt Lake City, Utah, from
Salt Lake ci ty Water Department data.
If the demand functions of different
groups of water users are linear with
common intercepts, the slopes and
intercept terms of the demand could be
estimated using the data for elasticity,
existing prices, and quantities of water
consumed by the individual households
belonging to different groups.
Hansen and Narayanan (1981) formulated a multivariate time series model
to study monthly variations in water
demand. The left-hand side variable in
their multivariate regression model was
municipal water demand and the righthand s ide contained price, average
temperature, total precipitation, and
percentage of daylight hours.
They
applied this model to Salt Lake City
Water Department data and obtained an
expression with a high multiple correlation coefficient and F-statistics.
Also, in ex post forecast, their model
accuratelypredicted monthly variation
in municipal water demand.
They reported a price elasticity of -0.469, and
this vlaue is used in estimating the
demand functions needed in this study.
Two other sets of data needed for
estimation of the demand functions are

Table 5.

the price of water and the distribution
of quantities of water consumed by
households at these prices. These data
were collected from records of the Salt
Lake City Water Department for the
growing season of 1981. Salt Lake City
Water Department has two price structures, one for customers within the city
limit and one for customers outside the
city limit (county customers),
The price struc ture for the period
under question is shown in Table 5.
The marginal prices of $0.25 and $0.37
per 100 cubic feet were used since
nearly all the customers used more than
1000 cu. ft.
As this study is mainly concerned
with residential water demand, a random
sample of size 125 was drawn from meter
readings of water connections up to 1
inch served by the Salt Lake City Water
Department. Sixty-nine of these customers were in the city limits, and the
remaining 56 meter readings were in the
county.
The bimonthly meter readings
were adjusted for and summed to show the
water consumption during the period of
May-September 1981.
A price of $0.25
per 100 cubic feet was used as the base
for calculating the demand function,
the quantities consumed by customers
paying the higher county rate were
adjusted upward by using the price
elasticity of -0.469 to estimate their
consumption at the price of $ 0.25 per
100 cubic feet.
The next step was to
group the consumers according to the
amount of water they consumed during
May-September 1981 as shown in Table
6.

Salt Lake City Water Department 1981 price structure.

City·

$3.50/lst 1000 Cubic Feet

$0.25/100 Cubic Feet Extra

County

$5.00/1st 1000 Cubic Feet

$0.37/100 Cubic Feet Extra
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Table 6.

Residential consumer groupings by May-September water consumption.

Group Range
in 100 ft3

Frequency

Percent of
Total

Sample
Mean
u

Second
Sample
Moment

Tu2'
u

lIz'

0-200

56

45

128.27

18,814.6

1.07

200-400

31

25

276.45

80,664.5

1.03

400-600

30

25

492.67

245,967.4

1.007

600-900

7

5

735.0

544,857.9

1.004

groups are n1 = 32,456, n2
n3 = 18,031, and n4 = 3,606.

Several grouping ranges were tried
before one was chosen.
The grouping
chosen has equal consumption ranges
and the standard deviation of each group
is approxmately the same.
This can be
seen by the increasing ratios of the
square root of u2 I to u among the
groups.
This ratio is similar to the
coefficient of variation, with the
di fference being that the st andard
deviation (square root of second
central moment) is replaced by the
square root of second ordinary moment
u2' •
As shown in Table 6, 45 percent
of the population is in a group consuming an average of 128.27 (l00 ft 3 ),
25 percent consuming 276.45 000 ft 3 ),
25 percent consuming 492.67 000 ft 3 )
and 5 percent consuming 735.0 (100
ft 3 ), from May through September at a
given price of $0.25/100 ft 3 •

=

18,031,

The data for streamflows, used to
estimate the water supply probability
density function, were on an acre-foot
basis, and all of the demand data were
converted to acre-feet.
A price of
$0.25/100 cubic feet is equivalent to
$108.90 per acre-foot, and the mean
water consumptions for the four groups
are:

Group

1
2
3

4

Sample Mean of
of Water Consumption
(Acre-foot)
0.2945
0.6346
1.1310
1.6873

These amounts of water consumption
at a price of $108',90, with a price
elasticity of -0.469, imply the following demand functions, which have a
common intercept term:

Data were also collected from the
Salt Lake City, Water Department on the
number of water connections for year
1981.
Table 7 shows numbers of connections by pipe size for both the city and
county.
There were 72,124 connections
up to 1 inch.
These are assumed to be
the residential or household customers.
Dividing proportional to the percentages
in the random sample reported in Table
6, the numbers of consumers in the four

Group 1 (D!) :
Group 2 (D2) :
Group 3 (D3):
Group 4 (D4) :
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PI = 341.0962 P2 = 341.0962 341.0962 P3
P3 = 341.0962 -

788.44 q
365.89 q
205.30 q
137.61 q

Table 7.

Number of water connections by size (1981).

Water Connection Size
Up to 1 inch
I" to 2"

City

County

Total

46,969

25,155

72 ,124

1,556

337

1,893

569

82

651

49,094

25,574

74,668

2" to 10"

Total

Based on these demand functions,
the estimated water consumption during
the growing season of 1981, at the given
price YlOuld be
4

r

niqi

= 47,478.3

acre-feet

i=l
The actual water consumption during the
period was 58,892.7 acre-feet.
The
difference of 11,414.4 acre-feet is
attributed to water consumption through
the connections larger than 1 inch that
were exc luded from the sample in this
study.
However, this is taken care of
in estimation of available water supply
by shifting the probability density
function.

These data were obtained from the annual
report of Salt Lake City Water Department (1979-1980).
The model in Chapter I I requires
description of the variable water supply
with a probability density function.
Assume that the available water supply,
Qs, has a transformed beta distribution
with the following density function:

f(Q ) =
s

Supply Estimation

for B < Q < A + B
s

o

Since the appropriate data for
estimating the marginal cost function
were not available, the marginal cost
was assumed to equal the average cost.
The average cost was estimated by
dividing the total operating expenses by
total water consumption (production):
AC (1980)

(A+B-Q ) 0-1
s

elsewhere

This density function limits the m1n1mum
and maximum water supply to Band
A+B, respectively.
It has a flexible
functional form and is quite well suited
to model stochast ic flows.
Figure 10
shows histograms for historical data as
well as estimated density function.

= Total

Operating Expenses =
Total Water Consumption

This density function has four
parameters which can be estimated
by the method of moments.
The first
four ordinary moments of this function
are given by:

9,792,907
92,207

= $106.20/acre-foot
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u

U

I

l

I

2

= B + A

A2

The water rights of the Salt Lake City
Water Department presented in Table 3 as
percentages of total streamflow were
multiplied by the respective water flows
and the products were summed over
the six creeks and then over the MaySeptember months for the period of
1911-1980.

y +

(y +

(X + l):y
l)(y + 6) + 2BA y +

o+

+ B2

U I

The first four ordinary moments
were calculated from the 70 observations.
In order to estimate the four
parameters of the density function, the
sample moments could be equated to the
population moments in the four equations
given above.
One could solve for the
four unknown parameters, but the solution would be difficult.
Therefore, it
was assumed that the lower limit of
density function, B is equal to zero,
and the rema1nl.ng three parameters
were estimated using the first three
sample moments and the corresponding
equations.
However, the results were
not satisfactory because the resulting
density function did not cover about 20
percent of the observations in the
sample.
A second simplification was
made by setting the upper limit, A+B, to
the sample maximum.

(y + 2)(X + l)y
(y + 0 + 2) (y + 0 + 1) (y + 0)

A3

3

2
+ 3BA

(X + l)y
(y + 0 + l)(y + 6)

+

u ' = A4 _ _~(~y+.,;..3::::..:):...;(wX.-:...+-=2.!-).;.-(y,--,+-=l.L). l. X:--:-_..,...
(y+ 0 +3) (y+6+2) (y+6+1) (y+o)
4
3
+ 4BA

2 2

+ 6B A

(y+2) (y+l)y
(y+o+2) (y+o+l) (y+o)

(y+l)y
3
v
4
(y+t;+l) (y+o) + 4B A~+ B

The data for estimation of parameters and the estimated values of y and
o are shown below:

These four parameters (y, 0, Band
A can be estimated from the four sample
moments; however, the solutions may not
be unique.
In order to calculate the
sample moments, measurements of the
water supply available to the Salt Lake
City Water Department during the May
through September growing seasons was
obtained for a number of years for which
data were available.

First sample moment ml'
Second sample moment m2'
B

=

A+B

= 69,062.5
= 5,267,714,560

0

=A

= sample maximum

= 127,210

and the parameter estimates:
In a "Salt Lake County Area-wide
Water Study,1t prepared by a group of
engineers for the three major water
utilities of Salt Lake County (Metropolitan Water District of Salt Lake City
et ale 1982), streamflows for the six
Wasatch creeks are listed on a monthly
basis. The Salt Lake City Water Department depends largely on these sources.

{

~=
"

3.8340

<5

3.2281

=

Presently, Salt Lake City Water
Department does not use any water
from Mill Creek for culinary purposes,
even through it has rights to about 50
percent of the flow.
But, it is expected that wi th increased demand, and
specially during times of water short-
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age, the Salt Lake City Water Department
will use its entitlement on Mill Creek.
Therefore, Mill Creek water was included
1n the available water supply.

upper limits of the density function,
namely Band A+B, but does not change
the values of the other two parameters,
y and
<5.
This procedure assumes that
those customers not included in the
demand estimation, would not be subjected to any rationing at times of
water shortage.
Figure 10 superimposes
the resulting histogram of water supply
availab Ie to the Salt Lake Ci ty Water
Department during May-September on the
probability density' function fitting a
beta distribution with the estimated
parameters. The fit appears reasonable.

The nonstochastic portion of the
availab Ie water supply was then calculated and used as a shift parameter for
the probability density function.
The
sources other than the six creeks,
net of the water consumption unaccounted
for in demand estimation, were assumed
nonstochastic. The total water from all
sources of supply other than the six
creeks are:

Application of the Model
and Results

Maximum water from all pump wells +
average water from Deer Creek
Reservoir + average water from
artesian wells + average water from
Mt. Olympus Spring + average water
from Boundary Spring + average
water from Lower Boundary Spring

= 9,819.8

The model for rationing scheme II,
developed in Chapter II, was chosen for
application to the case study area. The
rationale was that rationing scheme
II is more efficient than rationing
scheme I in that it always exhausts the
available water supply.

+ 9,476.6 + 1,804.7

+ 223.8 + 348.8 + 114.0

In order to solve the equations, a
nonlinear optimization program (MINOS)
wa's utilized. The numerical integration
for specification of the objective
function was accomplished through
the Gauss Quadrature method.
Depending
on whether the problem was constrained
or unconstrained, and on the nature of
the constraints, the computer runs took
11 to 17 seconds of CPU time.

21,787.7 acre-feet
These data were collected from
Salt Lake City Water Department usage
records and estimated for the period of
1970-1981.
Since the water pumped from
wells is not stochastic and determined
by the authorities in charge, the
maximum pumpage during the period
was used.
However, averages were used
for the other sources.

Block Rate Pricing Results
The solution gives block rate
pricing' when there are no constraints
imposed on the variab les qi IS.
The
only constraints on qi I S were derived
from the limits of integration, to make
the lower limit of integration less than
the upper limit. These amounted to the
following three constraints:

The water consumption not included
in the demand function is the actual
water consumption during the MaySeptember months of 1981 minus the water
consumption estimated from the demand
function or 11,414.4 acre-feet.
Therefore, the nonstochastic
portion of the water supply available to
residential customers would be 21,787.7
- 11 ,414.4 or 10,373.3 acre-feet. This
number was used in shifting the probability density function to the right.
The shift adds equally to the lower and
41

ql

i

q2

q2

i

q3

q3

i

q4

25%

E

0

-10.

co

20%

0

I I)

:c:

>(,)-

1.1
1.6

15%

1.50

Z
L&J

1.4
1.3

::::>

0

1.2

L&J
0:

LL.

1.1

10°/.

1.00
.9
.8
.1

L&J

>

~
..J
L&J

a::

.6

5%

c::::

-....
o

( .)

c:

::J

~

II)

c::::

-4)

."

0

(I)

....

0.50 .4

.3
.2

)(

o
o

.1

10

40

50

60

7°

75 80

90

100

110

140

THOUSAND ACRE FEET

Figure 10.

Histogram of probability density function for available water supply in
May-September months (1911-1980).

20 percent
group.

Table 8 shows the results calculated from the demand functions.
The
results are shown for average cost
of $106.20 as we 11 as for increases of
10 and 20 percent. The decreasing price
for groups using more water suggests
decreasing block rate schedule.

for consumers of the fourth

Another analysis examined the
effects of shifts in the density function of the available water supply,
while keeping the average cost at
$106.20.
If the density functions were
shifted to the left (assuming no firm
water supply), the lower limit would be
zero, and the upper limit would be
127,210 acre-feet.
On the other hand
if Salt Lake City Water Department
was to acquire some 10,000 acre-feet of
nonstochastic water supply, perhaps by
developing more wells, the probability
density function would shift to the
right by this amount.
The results of

Should average cost increase hy 10
percent, the model suggests that the
price be raised by 8.5 percent for the
first group, 9 percent for the second,
9.8 percent for the third and 10 percent
for consumers of the fourth group.
If
average cost rises by 20 percent, prices
should be raised by 17.2 percent for the
first group, 18.1 percent for the
second, 19.7 percent for the third, and
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Table 8.

Block rate pricing results for three different levels of average cost.a,b
AC

$106.20

AC = $116.82
(10% increase in AC)

AC = $127.44
(20% l.ncrease in AC)

q

p

q

p

Group 1

0.291

$111.66

0.279

$120.99

0.267

$130.65

Group 2

0.632

$109.85

0.605

$119.58

0.578

$129.59

Group 3

1.141

$106.85

1.090

$117.24

1.039

$127.77

Group 4

1. 707

$106.20

1.630

$116.82

1.553

$127.44

Total
demand
Value of
Objective
function

47,594

$5,604,754

45,515

$5,117,119

q

P

43,420

$4,649,832

aQuantities demanded qi are all in acre-feet.
bCosts and prices are all per acre-foot.
groups, the objective function was
constrained and then solved.
The
following three constraints were derived
from the four ind ividual household
demand func t ions and used for prob lem
solution.

these two cases are presented in Table
9.
The results show that a shift of
the density function. to the left would
increase the optimal prices and that a
shift to the right would decrease
the optimal prices charged to all the
consumers except those in Group IV.
Table 10 shows rationing rules by water
supply ranges and the probabilities
associated with them. It also shows the
groupe s) for which the rat ion quota is
binding.
These rationing rules and
ranges of water supply are derived for
AC = $106.20. According to the top row
in the table, rationing for the ordinary
residential water user would only be
necessary for the 1000-year (0.10
percent probability) drought.

Constraint 1:

2.15486 q1 - q2 = 0.0

Constraint 2:

1.78222 q2 - q3 = 0.0

Constraint 3:

1.49190 q3 - q4 = 0.0

Solutions of the constrained
problem, along with the uniform optimal
prices, are shown in Table 11 for
original average cost of $106.20, as
well as for the increases in average
cost of 10 and 20 percent.
These
results suggest that if average cost
increases by 10 percent, the price
charged to consumers should be raised by
9.3 percent, and if average cost increases by 20 percent, price should be
raised by 18.8 percent.

Uniform Rate Pricing Results
In order to derive an optimal
un i form pr ice for consumers of all
43

Table 9.

Block rate pricing results:
water supply.a

shifts in probability density function of

(Shift to Left)
0.0.s. Qs .s. 127,210

(Shift to Right)
20,373.3.s. Qs .s. 147,583.3

q

p

q

Group 1

0.283

$118.12

0.296

$107.84

Group 2

0.623

$112.91

0.638

$107.56

Group 3

1.140

$107.11

1.143

$106.46

Group 4

1. 707

$106.20

1.707

$106.20

Total
demand
Value of
objective
function

P

47,873

47,130

$5,512,020

$5,637,588

aQuantities are all in acre-feet and prices and average costs are all per acrefoot.

Conclusions and Suggestions
for Further Research

Table 12 depicts the situations for
uniform pricing when the probability
density function of available water
supply shifts to the left and right by
the same amounts used for the block rate
pricing case. The average cost was kept
at the original level of $106.20.

I f the marke t s for res ident ial
water were not characterized by price
rigidity, an instantaneous price adjustment process would have always equated
the total quantity demanded with avail~
able water supply.
In order to account
for the stochastic nature of surface
water supply, the expected surplus was
defined as:

Table 13 shows the rationing rules
according to the ranges of available
water supply, the groups for which
rationing is binding, and the probabilities associated with these ranges.

ES

It can be concluded from Tables 10
and 13 that the probability of the water
supply falling short of the total
demand is about 8.6 percent.
On an
average, a water shortage is likely to
occur about every 12 years for the
suggested pricing scheme.
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Table 10.

Rationing rules for the block rate pricing problem according
range of available water supply.a

Range of Water Supply
(acre- feet)

10,373.3

Probabil ity
(Percent)

< Qs < 21,001.8

to the

Rationing Rule

0.10

qr

= 72 , 124

(Binding for consumers
of all 4 groups)

21,001.8

i Qs i

34,538.9

1.96

34,538.9

i

45,554.5

5.19

Qs

i

Qs - 9,450.9
39,668
(Binding for consumers
of groups 2, 3, and 4)

Q - 20,854.6
qr 21,637
_

--=8---",..,.---:-::-::--_ _

(Binding for consumers
of groups 3 and 4)

45,554.5

Q

i Qs i

47,593.7

1.43

qr

=

8

- 41,438

3,606

(Binding for consumers
of the last group)

47,593.7

i

Qs

i

137,583.3

No rationing needed

91.4

aQuantities are all in acre-feet.

+lA+B

and the other arguments are the same as
defined before.
Solving this problem
gives

Q*

Q

I
J
Q*

P(Q)dQ -

o

MC(Q)

ES
f(Q )dQ
8

=

~s

acre-feet

= $5,620,:pO

which suggests the optimal price to be P
or the same as the
average cost.
Therefore in absence of
price rigidity, the solutions for the
stochastic and deterministic problems
are the same.

= $106.20/ acre-feet

S

0

where P(Q)
function
P

Q*

= 48,035

the inverse market demand

The difference between the value of
the objective function with flexible

341.0962 - 0.00489 Q
45

Table 11.

Uniform rate
cost.a,b

pricing

results

AC - $106.20
Uniform
Price: P

for

three different

AC = $116.82
00% increase in AC)

$108.43

$118.56

levels of average
AC = $127.44
(20% increase in AC)
$128.79

ql

0.295

0.282

0.269

q2

0.636

0.608

0.580

q3

1.133

1.084

1.034

%

1.691

1.617

1.543

Total
demand
Value of
object ive
function

47,574

45,502

43,412

5,604,339

5,116,862

4,649,677

aA11 quantities are in acre-feet.
bCos t sand pr ic es are all per ac re-foot .
Table 12.

Uniform rate pricing results:
water supply.a,b

shifts in probability density function of

(Shift to left)
0.0 ~ Qs ~ 127,210
Uniform
Price: P

$110.99

(Shift to Right)
20,373.3 i Qs ~ 147,583.3

$106.98

ql

0.292

0.297

q2

0.629

0.640

q3

1.120

1.140

q4

1.672

1. 701

Total
demand
Value of
objective
functio'n

47,052

47,870

5,510,080

5,637,545

aAll quantities are in acre-feet.
beosts and prices are all per acre-foot.
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Table 13.

Rationing rules for the uniform rate pricing problem according to the
ranges of available water supply.a

Range of Water Supply
(acre-feet)

Probability
(Percent)

< Qs < 21,276.6

0.12

21,276.6 ~ Qs ~ 34,803.4

2.03

10,373.3

Rationing Rule

Q
qr =

s

72,124
(Binding for consumers
of all 4 groups)

qr

=

Q - 9,574.5
s 39,668

(Binding for consumers
of groups 2, 3, and 4)

34,803.4 ~ Qs ~ 45,557.0

5.12

qr

=

Q - 21,042.2
s 21,637

(Binding for consumers
of groups 3 and 4)

45,557.0 ~ Qs ~ 47,574.0

47,574.0 ~ Qs ~ 137,583.3

1.41

91.4

qr -

Q

- 41,471.4

-.::!s_-:--___- - -

3,606
(Binding for consumers
of the last (4th) group)
No rationing needed

aQuantities are all in acre-feet.

an amount such that they end up in the
higher-priced block and others will end
up in the lower" (Hirshliefer et al.
1960, p.
45).
One interesting result
of this study is the suggestion of
decreasing block rates for water.
A
price schedule with decreasing block
rates implies that the consumer is, in
effect, facing a downward sloping supply
schedule (Taylor 1975).
Converting the
results of Table 8 to a 100 cubic foot
basis, which is the unit used by Salt
Lake City Water Department, the model

prl.cl.ng ($5,620,370) and the value of
objective function for rigid uniform
pricing ($5,604,339) is $16,030.
This
amount can be regarded as the we Ifare
cost of price rigidity and associated
quantity rationing.
Block rate pricing is becoming a
common rate structure for public
utilities.
When "such block system
is used marginal values in use will
not in general be equated between
individuals; some will tend to consume
47

Qs falls short of Q*, the total quantity
of water demanded at these optimal
prices.
This definition is more sui table for policy purposes and follows
the principle suggested by Howe et a1.
(1980, p. 4) of entering the expectation
of water users into the definition of
drought.

suggests the following price schedule
for monthly wa ter sal es d ur ing the
growing season:
Price/IOO
cubic feet

$0.256
$0.250·
$0.245
$0.243

Monthly
Water Consumption
up
up
up
up

to
to
to
to

25 (100 ft 3 )
55 (100 ft 3 )
96 (100 ft 3 )
149 (100 ft 3 )

Another characteristic of the
mode 1 s i s that t he price charged to
consumers would be greater than marginal
cost in order to minimize the we lfare
loss resulting from rationing.
The
greater the welfare loss of rationing,
the more the deviation from marginal
cos t.
Rationing scheme I has greater
welfare losses (due to cases of nonexhaustion of water supply at times of
rationing) than does rationing scheme
II. Had rationing scheme I been applied
in this study, it would· have given
higher prices.

However, considering the administrative
costs of calculating consumer bills with
different rates and the small difference
bet we en the val u e s 0 f the 0 b j e c t i v e
functions for block rate pricing and
uniform pricing in Tables 8 and 11,
block rate pricing is not justified.
The uniform pricing

result of

$108.43 per acre-foot is equi va lent
to $0.249 per 100 cubic feet, which is
very close to the price of $0.25 per 100
cubic feet charged to consumers at the
time by Salt Lake City Water Department.
Therefore, this study concludes that the
existing pricing policies of Salt Lake
City Water Department are optimal,
even when we bring the price r igidi ty
and stochastic water supply into the
scenario of price determination.

One direction for further research
would be to examine the effect of
reservoirs for water storage.
In this
case, calculation of Qs' the available
water supply for each period, would add
the amount of water in the reservoir at
the beginning of the period to the
amount of runoff during the period.
Another study could examine mUltiple
sources of supply.
If consumers of
different localities were to be served
from different sources, separate probability density functions would be
needed.

The models outlined in this study
propose second best type solutions to
allocating water at times of shortage
under price rigidity.
The rationing
rules derived conform to the actual
policies pursued by many water supply
utilities during shortages.

On the demand side, more effort
could be placed on estimation of multiple group demand functions and on
rationing rules based on a percentage of
previous use.
If the agricultural,
industrial, and municipal demand functions for water could be estimated
separately, the model could be used for
optimal intersectoral allocation of
water.

Most drought indices provide some
physical measurement of drought that is
exogenous to the socio-economic system.
In contrast, the models presented in
this study define drought as an endogenous variable.
After selecting the
optimal long run prices, drought is
defined as the cases where water supply
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CHAPTER IV
ESTIMATED INEFFICIENCIES OF SHORT-TERM WATER
RESOURCES IMMOBILITY DURING DROUGHT
Introduc

1.
Abs ence of art ific ial constraints on prices by government,
labor, business, or other institutions.

of water rights and the pricing of water
have evolved which, at least in the
short-run, violate one or more of the
above assumptions.
In particular, most
states enforce the appropriations
doctrine through institutional and legal
restrictions on the sale of water or the
intersectoral transfer of water rights
that effectively retard the rate at
which such transactions can occur.
Another common problem is fixed or
lagging water prices.
These typically
understate the real value of the resource and thereby widen the gap between
supply and demand.
During a period of
water scarcity, these kinds of shortterm restrictions tend to reduce consumer benefits.
This chapter estimates
such losses during a recent drought in
Salt Lake County, Utah.

2.
Free movement of the resource
between markets or sectors.

Problems in Estimation of
Efficiency Costs of Immobility

3.
Perfect information throughout
the market regarding the price of the
resource.

The efficiency costs of water
resour!Ces immobility can be estimated
by comparing the benefits that would
theoretically accrue to water users
if the resource were being allocated
according to free market assumptions
to the benefits in fact observed under
actual conditions.

Short-term Resources Immobility
The net economic benefits of
resource use equal the total benefits
less cost, a difference that can be
divided between consumers I and producers I surplus.
Price theory shows
that optimal resource allocation occurs
when the shadow price of the resource
equals the marginal cost value of
supplying it to each economic sector.
This classical microeconomics tenet
rest s upon a number of as sumpt ions
(James and Lee 1971, Ch. 3), including:

4.
source.

Full

employment

0

f

t he re-

These conditions are rarely met, but
are frequently assumed as a basis
for jUdging the efficiency of actual
markets.
When the above assumpti~ns
are violated, the resource is not free
to travel from lower-valued uses to
higher-valued uses.
This situation,
of course, represents an inefficient
allocation of the resource.

If benefits are measured as the sum
of consumer and producer surplus, one
needs supply and demand curves.
Obtaining expressions for supply and
demand is made difficult by a variety of
factors. First, demand for water shifts
seasonally.
Some causes of the shift
may be stochastic in character (e.g.,
temperature and precipitation), thus
yielding stochastic demand curves and

In the western states, various
institutions dealing with the allocation
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necessitating estimation of consumer
surplus as expected values.
Also,
during a drought situation, regulatory
water conservation measures are frequently imposed and temporarily shift
the demand curve. Quantitative description of these artificial shifts is quite
difficult.

development in the face of a stochastic
water supply.
Some others have argued
that in application, however, the
appropriations doctrine frequently leads
to inefficient water use.
For example,
Meyers and Tarlock (1980) believe that
appropriative rights are not easily
transferred between economic sectors due
to the lack of any well-defined market.
They con tend tha t wa ter righ t s are
simply not bought and sold freely.

A second set of difficulties
surrounds estimation of the resource
supply.
By its very nature, the hydrologic system is stochastic, and prediction of future levels of streamflow, for
example, ~s an imprecise science.
Again, one is forced to resort to
estimation of expected values in order
to for-ecast producer surplus.

Legal Considerations

A more severe criticism of the
appropriations doctrine, especially
from the standpoint of efficient water
use in times of comparative scarcity,
has been raised against the "firs t in
time, first in right" clause (Meyers and
Tarlock 1980).
Under this mechanism,
appropriators are senior and junior to
one another along a sc ale from the
oldest appropriation to the youngest.
In times of water shortage, junior
rights drop out first and lose everything before the next senior right
loses anything.
This fai Is to spread
the economic risk inherent in the
randomness of the water supply and
violates two basic economic principles.
The first involves marginal productivity.
A junior appropriator who
loses all his water also loses marginal
units of high productivity, while
a senior appropriator ret ains marginal
units of low productivity.
The second
involves the pooling of risk.
Meyers
and Tarlock (1980) contend that under
the appropriation doctrine, the individual rights are defined in such a way
that the aggregate variability of supply
is greater than that which nature
mposes.
The risks incurred in water
resources development are distributed
unequally.

The Appropriations Doctrine.
In
arid climates throughout the world, one
version or another of the appropriations
doctrine is frequently followed in the
allocation of water rights.
The appropriations doctrine has been adopted in
most of the western states. The purpose
of the appropriations doctrine is to
protect investments in water resources

Both criticisms of the appropriation doctrine posed above may be
misdirected.
First, although there
does appear to be immobility in water
right markets, the cause appears to be
mostly due to delays in approval by
state water right engineers which are
required for administrative review of
changes ~n location or type of use.

Nature of the Research
This chapter documents an application of a nonlinear optimization model
to estimate optimal water allocations
during the 1976-77 drought in Salt Lake
County. The optimal policy according to
the model was contrasted to the actual
water allocations observed during the
drought to estimate the inefficiences
produced by certain nonmarket controls.
The following sections of the chapter:
1) review the reasons for short-term
immobility of water resources, 2)
describe the optimization model, the
policy options it explores, and its
specific formulation for Salt Lake
County, 3) present the results of the
modeling efforts, and 4) draw conclusions.
Factors Affecting Water Allocation
and Use During Drought
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Although some delays are inevitable,
the alternative to the appropriative
doctrine may be a plethora of lawsuits
--if the psuedo-legal authority of the
state engineer did not exist--thereby
causing greater delays.
As to the
junior-senior water right decision rule,
the criticism above is valid only if one
assumes that junior users are unable to
rent or buy water from senior users. At
any rate, water market immobility does
appear to exist.
An indepth discussion
. of whether immobility is better or worse
under the appropriation doctrine vs.
some other form of water law is beyond
the scope of this study.

3.
Passage of sufficient time to
allow protests, if any, to be filed.
4.
Cons ideration of the appl ication and any protests by the state
engineer before announcement of approval
or rejection of the transfer request.
The state engineer's determination is
final, subject to judicial review.
Accomplishing these steps may take some
months, espec ially if junior water
rights in return flow are involved.
During a severe drought, passage of this
much time could conceivably result in
considerable economic loss.
Water
rights brokering services have been
proposed (Bagley et al. 1980) as a
mechanism for facilitating the transfer
process, but at present no such service
is available.

Application of appropriative rights
in Utah. As applied in most states, the
appropriations doctrine allows the owner
of a water right to sell the right to
another.
The new owner may then change
the point ·of diversion or transfer the
right to a different place or kind of
use subject to an administrative review
designed to protect other water users
from any adverse effects that may
result.
However, smooth operation of
the water rights transfer process is
frequently impeded (perhaps for good
reason) by legal and institutfonal
obs tac les (see Meyers and Tarlock 1980
and National Water Commission 1973). In
part icular, the administrat ive proceedings required by most states preclude the rapid transfer of rights to
meet the demands of higher-valued uses
1n times of drought.

Water Pricing Policies
Demand management in the municipal
and industrial sector. It is common for
municipal and industrial (M&I) water
supply systems to charge uniform rates
over time.
However, M&I water demands
typically show considerable temporal
variability (Linaweaver et al. 1966) as
they vary with seasonal water use.
In
spite of the fact that the M&I sector is
particularly amenable to demand regulation through pricing (Le., the beneficiaries of the service are easily
identified and those not willing to pay
can be easily excluded), peak-load
pricing policies are not widely used.
In a series of pub lications, Davis and
Hanke have stressed the advantages of
seasonal peak load rates (see Davis and
Hanke 1971, 1972; Hanke and Davis 1971;
Hanke 1972).

In Utah, the transfer of water
rights (or even the sale of water
by one sector to another in substantial
quant it ies) is accompl ished through
procedures analogous to those pertaining
to applications to appropriate- water
(Hutchins and Jensen 1965).
These
procedures require:

Water supply charges are also
commonly held constant over space
as well as time.
Since the cost of
delivering water is a function of
these variables, water prices should be
established with reference to distance
from the supply, population, density,
and elevation (see Hanke 1972, Gaffney
1969, Vickrey 1969),

1.
Written application to the
state engineer requesting the trans fer.
2.
Publication
application.

of

notice

of
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The water pr~c~ng options available
for drought management may be analyzed
from the standpoint of microeconomic
theory (Whipple 1981).
First, in an
economically efficient
system, the
cos t 0 f e a c h good will ref 1 e c t the
opportunity cost to society of using
scarce resources to produce that good.
During a normal period, the supply curve
for water may be represented by 81 in
Figure 11.
The demand for water is
given by curve Dl.
When a drought
occurs, the decline in water supply can
be illustrated by a leftward shift 1n
the supply curve to 82.
As seen from
Figure 11, if price ~s to remain constant, then measures must be taken that
either increase the supply of water
(thereby moving 82 toward 81), or
reduce the demand for water (shifting
Dl toward D2)'
A third option, of
course, is to increase price from PI
toward P2'

structural measures quickly. Outside of
emergency drilling of wells and repair
of leaks, relatively little can be done
structurally to increase water supply.
A nonstructural alternative would be for
. higher-valued users to purchase water
from lower-valued users.
This alternative, however, is complicated by the
institutional inertia discussed in the
previous section.
Increasing the price of water from
P I t 0 P 2 wo u 1 d red u c e the qua n tit y
of wa ter demanded to Q2'
However,
price increases are frequently difficult
to apply due to institutional and
political reasons (Whipple 1981).
Reduc t ion in demand dur ing periods
of d r 0 ug h t , the ref 0 r e , ~ s the mo r e
common policy.
From an efficiency
viewpoint, however. involuntary demand
reduction results in a loss of consumer
benefit as compared to a policy equating
marginal benefits and costs.
From
Figure 11, the loss in consumer and
producer benefits induced by adopting an
involuntary demand reduction policy
rather than a policy that increases
price from PI to P2 is equal to the
area above the 82 supply curve wi thin
the triangle labeled "abc".

If supply could be restored to the
81 level, then the quantity of water
sup p 1 i e d at p ric e P 1 wo u 1 d b e Q 1 .
However, during a severe drought it is
generally difficult to implement major

l&J
U
0::

Marginal cost pricing in the
agricultural sector.
In a stinging
cr~t~c~sm of
irrigation water pr~c~ng
policies, Hanke and Davis (1973) identify several ways by which alternative
pricing schemes could be employed to
inc reas e the ec onomi c e ff ic iency of
irrigation.
These include establishing
prices as a funct ion of actual opportunity cost and realistic interest rates
and relating prices to seasonal changes
in supply and demand conditions.
In
general, Hanke and Davis (1973) follow
Gaffney (1962) in advocating streamlining the market for water rights.

a
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QUANTITY OF WATER
Figure 11.

In principle, the marginal costmarginal price analysis of a leftward
shift in supply offered in the previous
section applies to the agricultural
sector as well as to M&I.
However,

8upply and demand functions
for water.
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only a radical shi ft from the current
"ability-to-pay" pricing criterion to a
policy of cost-based pricing and the
introduction of a working market for
water rights will make it possible for
water pricing alternatives to contribute
to drought management in the agricultural sector.
Institutional and
political constraints presently preclude
the application of effective pricing
policies for irrigation water, even
through increased social gains might
result (Howitt et a1. 1980, Kelso
1967 ).

border the county on the west, rising
to 9,500 feet.
Annual prec ipitation on
the valley floor normally ranges from 12
to 16 inches. The county was originally
settled by Mormon pioneers in 1847, who
immediately began diverting water from
mountain streams for irrigation.
Winter storms in the Wasatch
Mountains produce accumulations of
snow which result in high runoff from
spring snowmelt.
Much of the snowmelt
a 1 so in f i1 t rat e s i n t o t h e so i 1 and
thereby contributes a relatively
large baseflow component to Wasatch
Front streams.

A Case Study: The 1977 Drought
in Salt Lake County, Utah
During the 1977 water year, much of
the U.S. suffered a severe drought. In
Salt Lake County the surface waters
generally used for M&I supply were
drast ically reduced, and a variety of
water conservation programs were enacted
to decrease demand.
The only substantial supply augmentation attempted
was the drilling of new wells and
increased pumping of existing wells.
Relatively little was done from a
drought management standpoint to change
the allocation of water among sectors or
to adjust water prices.
Consequently,
the response of Salt Lake County to the
1977 drought is a good candidate for
contrasts with the response that would
be expected in a true water market
situation, where water management would
be less dominated by short-run rigidity
in water transfers and price adjustments. Salt Lake County also represents
a good case study area because of
relatively good data on municipal water
supply and stream flow.
The Study Area
Overview.
Salt Lake County covers
an area of 764 square miles, of which 65
percent is valley and the rest is
mountainous terrain.
On the east side
of the county, the Wa sa tch Mount ai n
Range rises to elevations in excess of
11,000 feet.
The Oquirrh Mountains

Water resources.
On the east side
of the valley, the seven maj or creeks
are continuously gaged, with most
records dating back to the turn of the
century.
Mean annual flow from these
streams totals approximately 150,000
acre-feet. Several minor drainages also
exist on the east side, and there are
six minor drainages from the Oquirrh
Range on the west. Because the Wasatch
Range is much higher than the Oquirrhs,
and because the catchment s are on the
windward side of the range, the Wasatch
catchments receive more precipitation
than the Oquirrh catchments.
The single largest source of
surface inflow into the county is the
Jordan River, which originates at the
outlet of Utah Lake and flows north out
of Utah County into Salt Lake County.
The annual inflow from the Jordan River
is about 260,000 acre-feet. The quality
of water is too poor for municipal use,
but flows are sui table for irrigation
and industrial uses.
Groundwater in the county is
obtained through springs and pumped
wells. The valley subsurface is largely
unconsolidated and acts as a large
reservoir.
Groundwater utilization is
increasing, with present usage at about
100,000 acre-feet annually.
Safe yield
has been estimated at approximately
150,000 acre-feet.
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Water is imported into Salt Lake
County from Deer Creek Reservoir on
the Provo River, from the Provo River
downstream from the reservoir, and from
springs in Tooele Valley.
The Deer
Creek and Provo River water is used for
M&I purposes, the Provo River diversions
are for both M&I and irrigation, and the
Tooele Valley imports are used exclusive ly by Kennecott Copper Corporation for smelter and concentrator
operations.

capita withdrawals
0.27 acre-feet.
annual municipal
outdoors for lawns

Industrial water use has been
increasing at a rate of roughly 1000
acre-feet per year and presently stands
at about 160,000 acre-feet per year.
The largest industrial user is Kennecott
Copper Corporation.
Agricultural use includes irrigation and stock watering.
Diversions
for irrigation show a slight downward
trend in recent years, and irrigated
acreage has undergone a much more
pronounced decrease (see Tables 14 and
15).
Dividing 1975 irrigation diversions by estimates of the total irrigated acreage for that year gives an
approximate diversion of 7.9 acre-feet
per acre. A more realistic application,
considering typical efficiencies and
water requirements, would be 5 acre-feet
per acre.

Water use.
Munic ipal water use in
Salt Lake County (water deliveries
for domestic, commercial, fire fighting,
and public service uses as well as
potable water from municipal systems
delivered to the industrial sector) has
been rising, with withdrawals for
municipal 'use from 1962 to 1975 increasing by about 4,500 acre-feet
annually (see Table 14).
Annual per

Table 14.

Historical Salt Lake
water withdrawals
ac-ft).

average approximately
Roughly half of the
deliveries is used
and gardens.

County
( 1000

Optimization Model
Subregional County Divisions

Year

Municipal

1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975

197
104
108
100
127
115

Average

Irrigation

Industrial

133
120
140
146
134
160
143

281
271
276
303
359
313
296
312
305
301
306
281
311
277

a
110
a
114
120
127
143
158
153
158
163
177
170
139

125

299

144b

III

In order to achieve as much spatial
resolution as possible in assessing
drought impacts, the study area was
divided into seven subregions as indicated in Figure 12. These subregions
were chosen following the work by Bishop
et al. 0974, 1975), Narayanan et al.

Table 15.

aNot available
bl2-year average
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Historical Salt Lake
irrigated acreage.

Year

Irrigated Land
(1000 acres)

1935
1955
1975

48
44
35

County

GREAT
SALT
LAKE

DIVISIONS OF
SALT LAKE COUNTY
Figure 12.

Subregions used in the Salt Lake County case study.

(976)) and Pratishthananda and Bishop
0977}.
The subregions were formulated
so as to constitute as coherent a unit
as possible considering watershed
subbasins, water supply distribution
systems) and water district boundaries.
All water supply and use data for the
optimization model were specified at the
subregion level.

Estimation of municipal benefits.
The total benefits of water use in
the municipal sector were expressed as
the sum of the areas under each 0 f
five municipal demand curves (one for
each of the months of May through
September) for each subregion of the
model.
Referring to Figure 13, total
municipal benefit, MB, can be expressed
as:

Objective Function
-CI.

The objective function used in the
optimization is maximization of the
net benefits of water use in the M&I
and agricultural sectors.

'

Q rt dQ
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Figure 13.

Estimation of gross municipal benefits.

monthly temperature, P is the logarithm
of marginal price of water, and L is the
logarithm of the percent of the annual
daylight hours in the month.
The
weather stations that were selected to
represent the various subregions are
listed in Table 16, together with the
mean precipitations and temperatures for
the months of May through September as
well as the values observed in 1977.
Table 17 presents the demand curves that
were estimated for the subregions for
each of the seasons, using both mean and
1977 temperature and precipitation data.

where t=l, •••• 5 is an index on months,
r=l • . . • • 7 is an index on county
subregions, CM rt is a parameter for
the region determined from monthly
temperature and precipitation, art is
the inverse of demand elasticity, and
Qrt* is the quantity of water delivered
for the municipal sector in the rth
subregion in the tth season.
Demand curves for the municipal
sec tor we re es t imated from monthly
precipitation, temperature, and daylight
hours data as recommended by Hansen
(1981) and Hansen and Narayanan (1981).
They propose municipal demand curves
having the formulation:

Estimation of agricultural benefits.
Agricultural benefits are expressed as gross revenues from the
sale of commodities less the costs of
production, exclusive of water delivery
costs.
Farm budgets published in
the Utah Agricultural Census for 1974
through 1976 were used to obtain average
crop product ion c.osts and sale prices.
These averages were used in the model.

where Dis the natural 1 ogari thm of
water demand, f31 are coefficients, I
is the natural logarithm of monthly
rainfall, T is the logarithm of mean
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Table 16.

Monthly Precipitation (inches)

Monthly Temperature (OF)

Subregion

Representarive
Weather
Station

Mean

1977

June
Mean
1977

Jul:t
Mean 1977

AUilust
Mean
1977

D.

Magna area

Garfield

60.65

55.7

65.81

75.9

79.67

78.0

77 .23

E.

Salt Lake
City area

Salt Lake
City Airport

59.28

55.0

67.84

73.2

77.13

77.3

Salt Lake
City Suburban
Sewage
Plant

59.65

55.4

67.90

71.3

76.51

76.2

Fl' HunterGranger
area
Vl
-...J

Subregion climatic characteristics.

Ma:t

Se~tember

AUilust
Mean 1977

SeEtember
Mean 1977

4.76

0.57

3.79

0.72

0.94

1.08

1.73

1.13

0.06

0.70

0.61

0.89

1.85

0.85

1.85

3.79

1.08

0.00

0.88

0.82

0.68

1.49

0.84

1.34

Mean

Ma:t
1917

75.8

66.73

66.6

1.64

3.62

1.41

74.69

75.0

64.31

66.4

1.38

4.76

74.55

74.0

64.81

65.6

1.33

a

a

a

Murray
area

a

a

a

HI. West
Jordan

Jul:t
Mean 1977

1977

F2. South Salt
Lake area
G.

June
Mean 1917

Mean

Bingham
Canyon

54.61

52.3

62.88

71.1

72 .51

74.4

70.20

72.4

61.79

64.1

1.92

4.84

1.84

0.43

1.06

1.39

1.16

1.72

1.11

1.90

Cottonwood
Weir

60.41

55.3

69.29

75.7

79.55

77.9

77.27

75.1

61.80

68.9

2.04

6.77

1.45

0.31

0.67

2.03

1.15

2.12

1.34

3.39

area

H2. Draper
area

aSame weather station as FI subregion.

Table 17.

Estimated municipal demand curves by subregion.
Estimated eM Values a

Subregion

V1
00

June

July

August
Mean
1977

September
Mean
1977

Elasticityb

Mean

1977

Mean

1977

Mean

1977

D

-0.138

505.83

417.83

574.17

636.92

840.49

693.69

741.11

705.09

504.09

483.08

E

-0.469

51548

42453

63720

86097

82566

83568

73748

70915

52103

52211

F1

-0.138

2593.4

2131.2

3173.0

6165.5

3941.4

3941.8

3651.5

3379.4

2547.7

2492.5

F2

-0.469

26770

22352

32878

54704

41262

41181

38392

36149

27111

26844

G

-0.469

23837

19903

29277

48712

36742

36670

34186

32189

24141

23904

HI

-0.138

635.29

551.50

778.86

1053.5

1031.2

1045.7

918.18

928.94

667.07

671. 98

H2

-0.138

1610.6

1277.2

2009.0

2605.1

2694.7

2378.8

2320.7

2137.8

1650.5

1561.5

Ma~

aDem and for water is expressed as Q = CM p-a where Q is in acre-feet per month t CM is given above, P ~s
price in dollars per acre-foot t and a is elasticity.
bFrom Hansen (1981).

seasonal crop consumptive use requirements.

demand reduction techniques. The fourth
run assumes no demand reduction, but
requires that the irrigation water
rights on Wasatch Front streams not
yet covered by exchange agreements be
delivered in full to the agricultural sector.
Finally, the fifth run
assumes both demand reduction and
maintenance of agricultural water rights
east of the Jordan River. As such, it
represents an approximation of the
actual institutional situation that
prevailed during the drought. Table 21
summarizes the principal characteristics
of these five runs.

Results
Overview of Model Runs
Five runs were made with the model,
each representing a different set of
constraints on the water market as well
as different assumptions about the
stochasticity of the hydrologic system.
The first two runs represent free-market
responses to drought.
The first run
was made using the iterative approach
discussed previously, where expected
values of municipal demand and surface
supply for future seasons condition
the solution of each successive iteration.
The second run uses the actual
hydrologic conditions and M&I demands
for 1977 as inputs.

Optimization Results
The solutions were obtained using
the Modular In-core Nonlinear Optimization System, a nonlinear optimization
package developed by the Department of
Operations Research, Stanford University.
The results are summarized in
Table 22.
The total net benefit from
water use ranges from $47.86 million for
run five to $53.23 million for run two.
The run that performed best represented
a free-market given perfect knowledge of
hydrologic conditions.
The run which
produced the least consumer plus producer surplus was the most constrained
in that it limited water movement
between sectors as well as supplies to
M&I.
In between these extremes, additional constraints reduced the net
benefits.

The remaining three runs are also
deterministic in terms of water demands
and hydrology, but each represents a
departure from free-market conditions in
terms of an artific ial shift in the
demand for water andj or imposition of
constraints to movement of the resource
between economic sectors. The third run
constrains the M&I water use to quantities approximating those observed
in Salt Lake County during the 1977
drought.
These quantities were con-siderably less than normal and resulted
from the applicati?n of a variety of
Table 21.

Summary description of model runs.

Treatment of Hydrologic
Conditions
Run

Stochastic

1
2

X

3
4
5

Deterministic
X
X
X
X

Constraints Applied to Water Market
None

Water Conservation in M&I

Irrigation Water
Rights Maintained

X
X
X
X
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X
X

through September).
M& I and agricultural demands are also forecast from the
basis of expected monthly temperatures
and precipitation amounts.
These
forecast supply and demand quantities
are put into the model, and a solution
is obtained.
At the end of the next
month (May), new supply and demand
quantities can be forecast for the
remaining months.
These new forecasts
are entered into the model, along with
the optimal policies (in terms of water
prices, reservoir releases, etc.) that
were identified for May. At this point,
another solution is obtained to find the
optimal water management policies for
June, c ondi t ional upon the expected
values of future supplies and demands.
The process ~s continued, month-bymonth, with each iteration resulting in
identification of conditionally optimal
management policies and new estimations
of expected future supply and demand
conditions.

and the cross correlations are preserved in Ct only at lag-zero.
In
this approach, Et becomes
0

2 B

C

2
where 0
is the error variance, St is
a colufun vector with standardized
elements that are independent in time
and space, and B is a square matrix
that is estimated from B, where

BBT = M
o
A

where Me is the lag-zero cross-correlation matrix.
Table 20 presents the estimated
values of <p and e for each of the
surface streams.
Expected Demands
The expected municipal demands were
estimated from mean monthly prec~p~ta
tion and temperatures. These curves are
given in Table 17. Expected irrigation
demands were expressed in the model by
netting effective precipitation from the

Expected Values of Random Variables
A mul t ivariate analysis of the
sfreamflows from the gaged Wasatch
Front streams was conducted following
the procedures recommended by Salas
et al. (1980, Ch. 7). This analysis was
performed on monthly streamflow data for
the water years of 1947 through 1976.
Identification and estimation of autoregressive moving average (ARMA) models
for the surface supplies was done using
the Box-Jenkins procedure available on
the Stat istical Package for the Social
Sciences.
The multivariate model is of
the form

Table 20.

Estimated ARMA coefficients
for Wasatch Front streams.

e

Stream

where Zt is a vector_of standardized
flows for season t, Ct is the vector
of error terms for time t,. and ¢ i and
0j are, respectively, the autoregress~ve and moving average matrices of lags
i and j.
The procedure recommended by
Salas et al. (1980) yields a model where
the q, and e matrices are diagonal,
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City Creek

0.80453

-0.16475

Emigration Creek

0.85127

0

Parleys Creek

0.88258

0.18343

Mill Creek

0.86700

0

Big Cottonwood
Creek

0.57127

-0.26098

Little Cottonwood
Creek

0.56091

0

as representative of the general seasonal probability observed on gaged
streams for Salt Lake County as a whole
for the 1977 water year.
Limited
surface water storage is available in
three small reservoirs in watersheds on
the Wasatch Front. These reservoirs and
their capacities are listed in Table 19.
The model contains storage constraints
to allow seasonal carry-over consistent
with the capabilities of these reser-

where c is an index on crops, t is an
index on seasons, qct is the per acre
consumptive use water requirement
(adjusted for seasonal precipitation)
for the cth crop for the tth season,
Lic is the amount of land assigned to
the icth crop in land class i, and Qt
is the amount water available for
irrigation in the tth season, adjusted
for conveyance and application efficiences.
Crop rotat ion constraints as
recommended by Anderson (1972) were
also included.

VOIrs.

Agricultural production. The model
includes constraints which express
agricultural production and water
consumption for each subregion.
The
production constraints are of the
form

Solution Process and the Expected
Values of Stochastic Variables
Solution Process
Water planners do not have perfect
information when they make decisions.
Decisions on releases must consider
expected future inflows as well as
probable future demands.
Since both
supply and demand are stochastic,
an iterative approach was taken to
obtain an optimal water supply allocation, with each iteration estimating the
optimal values of control variables for
the next season. The iteration process
proceeds as follows.

where Yc is the yield of the cth crop,
Pic is the produc t ivi ty 0 f the cth
crop on the ith land class, and Lic is
the amount of land in class i allocated
to crop c. Four land classes consistent
with SCS designations were included in
the model.
Water consumption constraints were
written for each season as

At the end of the winter season
(April 30), the values of the streamflows are known.
These are used to
forecast expected values of streamflows
for the fo llowi ng five months (May

II
i

Table 19.

c

Capacities of major Salt Lake County reservoirs.

Reservoir
Mt. Dell
Lake Mary
Twin Lakes
Lower Bells Canyon
Reservoir

Stream

Capacity (ac-ft)

Parleys Creek
Big Cottonwood Creek
Big Cottonwood Creek
Bells Canyon Creek

3400
740
940

60

420

Crop yields by land productivity
class specified by Anderson (1972) were
used to estimate production for each of
eight crops.
Seasonal water requirements for these crops were obtained from
Anderson (1972) and from published crop
consumpt ive use requirements for northcental Utah (SCS 1976).

Table 18.

Source
City Creek
Parleys Creek
Big Cot tonwood
Little Cottonwood
Deer Creek Imports
Wells

In general, agricultural benefits
can be computed as:
Y

cri

-

k

c

L

cri

where BA is the net benefit of agricultural production, net of water supply
costs, c is an index on crops, r is an
index on subregions, i is an index on
land classes, a c is the sale price of
the cth crop, Ycri is the total yield
of the cth crop in the rth subregion
from the i th land class, kc is the
cost of land preparation, ha:rvesting,
etc., for the cth crop, and Lcri is
the amount of land allocated to the cth
crop, rth subregion, ith land class.

5.
6.
7.
8.

81.02
73.60
66.71
71.34
86.73
78.75

Water supply. Water supply to the
M&I sector within a subregion for a
given season is bounded by the total
water available from other subregions
minus exports to other subregions.
In·
general, the major surface water suppI ies for the M&I sector come from the
six Wasatch Front streams and Deer Creek
Reservoir.
Irrigation water is limited
to the total water available from canal
systems diverting water from the Jordan
River, from wells, and from other
surface water sources. The agricultural
sector maintains some rights on mountain
streams that produce water of a quality
suitable for treatment and distribution
to the M&I sector. Under a true market
situation, this water is available for
sale for M&I uses.

Full season alfalfa
Partial season alfalfa
Barley
New alfalfa with a barley nurse
crop
Corn silage
Sugar beets
Pasture
Wheat

Water supply costs.
The supply
costs were estimated from Salt Lake City
Water Department budgets contained in
the annual report s.
In general, water
supply costs reflect the costs of
collecting the water from a source and
transporting the water to a destination
for use or for treatment.
Table 18
shows estimated costs of water supply
from various sources.

Cost ($/ac-ft>

Model Constraints

The crops considered were:
1.
2.
3.
4.

Estimated water supply cos ts
for various sources.

The model places total annual
limits for each subregion on the
amount of well water that can be extracted.
These limits were obtained
from Bishop et al. (1975).
Surface
waters on ungaged streams available
in any given season for usage by the
appropriate economic sectors are estimated as the 90 percent probability
flows as published by MWDSC et al.
(1982).
This probability was selected
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Table 22.

Summary of solution results for five model runs.

Run
Number

Total Net
Benefit
($10 6 )

1
2
3
4
5

53.20
53.23
47.87
53.17
47.86

Groundwater
Use for M&I
(1000 ac-ft)
45.6
44.5
25.5
51.0
28.5

Wasatch Front
Water for M&I
(1000 ac-ft)
52.9
53.1
42.1
44.8
39.1

Both free market runs (with perfect
knowledge and stochastic information
respectively) performed better than any
of the runs involving water conservation
or maintenance of irrigation water
rights on Wasatch Front streams.
In
interpreting these figures) the absolute
numbers given as benefit estimates are
not accurate since the M&I demand curves
are hyperbol ic.
One should c.ompare
differences.

Wasatch Front
Water for
Irrigation
(1000 ac-ft)

Net Agricultural
Benefit
($106 )

1.8
1.7
6.1
10.2
10.2

2.4
2.4
2.3

2.4
2.3

The third and fifth runs employ
measures to reduce demand in the M&I
sector and show about five million
dollars less benefits.
Since the
agricultural benefits are nearly the
same) most of the reduction must be
attributed to losses of consumer and
produc er surplus resulting from the
induced art ific ial shift in the M&I
demand curves.

The two free market runs gave
similar results.
The first run has
slightly lower net benefits and small
differences in the distribution of water
use by source.
It is interesting that
the iterative approach to stochasticity
of supply and demand used in the first
run provides a solution nearly identical
to that resulting from assumptions of
perfect knowledge of future hydrologic
·conditions.

Water Pricing and Hydrologic
Stochasticity
Table 23 summarizes the model
estimates of optimal water prices for
the M&I sector for selected locations in
the county as computed for the first run
(applying an iterative approach to
variability in the surface inflows).
The model raises M&I water prices as the
growing season progresses.
Price
increases from the first month to the
last are approximately $0.10 per 1000
gallons.
These changes reflect shifts
in both demands and supplies as the
summer months pass.
The price shifts
would be far less pronounced if more
storage were available in the water
supply system so that excess high
surface flows in the early months could
be saved for higher demands in later
months.
To an extent, the model uses
the groundwater system for this purpose.

The fourth run) involving maintenance of irrigation water rights but
no water conservation measures) produces
benefits similar to those from the two
free market runs.
It replaces the
surface water lost to M&I because of
prior rights to agriculture by additional groundwater usage to augment the
reduc ed surface supplies.
Groundwater
pumping is greatest in the fourth run
because both demands and surface water
constraint were greatest.
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Table 23.

Optimal water prices at selected locations assuming stochastic inflows.

Optimal Water Prices ($/ ac-ft)
Location

May

June

July

August

Salt Lake City

93.71

106.82

113.78

127.45

127.45

South Salt Lake

66.71

79.82

86.78

100.45

100.45

Granger-Hunter

97.04

97.04

104.55

104.55

104.55

Murray

71 .34

71.34

78.85

78.85

78.85

Conclusions

September

Higher relative prices for groundwater
pumping would change this.

The two institutional factors
suspected of reducing benefits to
water users during times of drought
were inflexibilities in water pricing
(i.e., inability of the water supply
institutions to deliver water at a
price equal to marginal cost) and
sluggishness of market response to
reallocate water to higher valued uses.
These two problems are studied in the
context of the 1977 drought in Salt Lake
County.

The largest efficiency losses
resulted from inflexibly holding to the
lower prices set for normal water
availability conditions and the restrictions to municipal use that artificially
reduced demand to the amount of water
available. The reduced use resulted in
a fairly substantial revenue loss
(decline in producers surplus), but the
greater portion of the $5 million loss
was in consumer surplus and associated
with large quantity shifts on a demand
curve of low elasticity.

Optimization of the agricultural
water use indicates that irrigation
rights exceed the water needed for
efficient crop production.
This has
come about through a decrease in farm
acreage over the years without a corresponding decrease in water rights.
However, continued irrigation diversions
of waters of a quality suitable for
treatment and use in municipal supplies
did not significantly reduce the econom i c ben e fit s •
On ere a son i s t hat
little surface storage is available to
hold excess spring runoff for later M&I
use.
Also, the smaller quantities of
high-quality water that go to agriculture later in the year are easily
replaced with inexpensive groundwater.

These observations indicate that
the largest gains through more efficient
water allocation during drought, at
least in the study area, are probably to
be realized from allocating the reduced
water supplies by raising prices.
Whether temporary price increases are
inst itutionally feasib Ie or even worth
the cost of implementing needs to be
explored.
If more flexible pricing
policies are to have an impact on water
demand, the market must be sensitive to
short-term price changes.
Resident ial
users would have to be made aware
quickly of any price changes.
This
would require rapid mechanisms for
distributing price information.
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CHAPTER V
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The very severe one-year drought of
1976-77 brought forth a large array of
drought relief/management programs from
every level of government as well as
from individual water utilities.
In
retrospect the management policies such
as pricing, public education, and
various rationing concepts at the level
closest to the water users (water
companies, associations, districts,
municipalities, etc.) added motivation
for conservation that resulted in
sharing the shortages.
The large majority of government
relief programs in contrast provided
capital for water development investments which were not usable during the
I-year drought, but which will provide
benefits during future dry years.
In
this regard, an important reason for
such small losses in the western states
during this very severe drought was
that the much more serious hardships
experienced during the long drought in
the 1930s and other dry periods since
had caused a political climate favorable
to water development during previous
decades.
As a result, substantial
carryover storage volumes in major
reservoirs throughout the west at the
beginning of 1977 reduced losses that
would otherwise have been much more
extensive and severe.
Some government relief programs,
however, did produce important benefits
during the emergency.
An example was
the state emergency stock water program
in Utah. This effort provided portable
tanks on loan (mostly from military
bases) to ranchers so that water could
be hauled to stock in grazing areas.
Federal programs such as the ASCS
emergency stock feed program and the

U.S. Bureau of Reclamation water rental
programs also provided important re lief
when it was needed.
Management Policies in the
Municipal Sector-What Worked?
Specifically 1.n Utah, the three
most common rationing policies were 1)
restrictions on time for outdoor use
(24 of 33 systems sampled used this
po I i c y ); 2 ) P ric e inc rea s e s (9 0 f 33
sys tems)"; and 3) mandatory quant i ty
restrictions (S of 33 systems).
Four
systems in the sample used both time and
quantity restrictions.
A regression model applied to these
data gave the following information on
policy effectiveness:
1. A reduction of 1 hour per week
in the time in which outside watering is
allowed decreases total water use by
1.27 gallons per day for a typical
connection using 1000 gallons per day.
For connections with higher use levels,
the reduction will be greater.
In
contrast, utilities with voluntary
restrictions sometimes (3 of 9 cases)
experienced increased rather than
decreased use. A reasonab Ie hypothes is
is that water users perceive voluntary
restrictions as a forerunner of mandatory restrictions and therefore attempt
to soak their landscaping in preparation
for that occurrence.
2.
A price increase of 1 percent
leads to a 1/10 percent decrease in the
quantity of water consumed.
A price
elasticity that is lower during drought
than in normal times suggests that
users' behavior (demand function)
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changes during what they perceive as a
short term emergency and that moderate
price increases are not so effective in
managing consumption during droughts as
during normal periods.
Short run
adjustments are harder to make than long
run changes.
However large price
increases had major impacts on use.
A
major system which charged a $10/1000
gallon price for exceeding mandatory
quantity limits experienced a 50 percent
decrease in use.
3. For every 1000 gallon reduction
in the maximum allowable monthly water
use, a reduction in use of 4.46 gallons
per day was observed.
From an economic efficiency point
of view, mandatory restrictions on total
monthly use are probably a better choice
than mandatory outdoor time restrictions
since the former allows users to allocate water between indoor and outdoor
use as they choose.
However, both of
these appear to be more effective in
reducing water use than moderate increases in price.
It would take a
200 percent price increase to produce a
20 percent reduction in water use.
Nonprice Rationing in
the Municipal Sector
A model was presented for determ1n1ng the optimal long term price
schedule for rationing a stochastically
variabie water supply during the summer
peak demand season among groups of
municipal customers which have different
demands.
This model was applied to the
Salt Lake City water system using
historic data to simulate demand functions for four classes of users and
the system's supply function.
Prices
we reo b t a in e d for bot h a b 10 c k rat e
pricing policy and a uniform rate
policy.

pay a lower average price than groups
who use smaller quantities of water.
It was also found that the current
average price for water in Salt Lake
($0.25 per 1000 cubic feet) is very
close to optimal, given the ir current
array of water sources.

A t hi rd mode 1 analyzed various
drought management policies in terms of
their impact on net benefits to agricultural and municipal water users.
The
model has the capability to modify
policies monthly with a changing hydrologic situation.
It is designed to
optimize pricing policy and source
selection (groundwater vs.
surface
water for example).
The model as
applied to Salt Lake County with constraint sets varying from total freedom
for water exchanges between sectors with
unlimited price changes to institutional
constraints and flow matching those
prevailing during the 1976-77 drought.
Results for Salt Lake County
suggest that a large loss (about $5
million) in benefits (mostly consumer
surplus) occurred during the drought due
to inflexible prices. Optimal municipal
water prices would have varied from $71
to $127.
The stochastic portion of the
model makes excellent policy choices
when operated in a mode of monthly
policy corrections to match updated
hyd ro logic c ond i t ions.
The resul t s
were very c lose to those where perfect
knowledge of future hydrology was
used.
This model should provide an
excellent tool for judging water management policies in other locations,
both in terms of planning for drought
and for more typical conditions.

An interesting results was that
consumer surplus is maximized by a
decreasing block rate, that is, supply
best matches demand when groups of users
who consume larger quant it ies of water

Overall
Based on the case of water management during the 1977 drought in Salt
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Lake County, mandatory water use regulations proved much more effective than
price increases in reducing water
use to match the smaller supplies.
A theoretical analysis of the demand and
supply functions showed the current
prlclng schedule to be about optimal.
A third model showed that there were
substantial economic losses, largely
reduced consumer surplus for residential
users, associated with the 1977 regulations.
This combination of results
obviously suggests a need for research

on either restructuring drought water
use regulations so that the reductions better match uses of low economic value or on how to implement
changes to water price in a way that
makes the public more responsive in
the short run.
Nonstructural water
conservation programs need to be predesigned from
information on the
costs and results of various alternatives so that they are not hastely
thrown together during drought emergencies.
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Sector:

Program Design

-...j

0"\

Local Initiatives

Municipal/Domestic

Effec t iveness

Mandatory restriction to
50 percent of normal outdoor use ($lO!K gal penalty
for violation (also time
restrictions)

Very good almost no
violation

Public education (on conservation) via messages
enclosed with monthly bill

Good response
revealed in
post drought
survey

Constraints and
Side Effects

Program/System
Identifier

Large decrease in
revenue. Some
landscaping destroyed due to
fear of penalty.
Increase to above
normal use during
month following
Ii fting of restrictions

Salt Lake County
(Utah) Water Conservancy District

Hughes et
al. 1978

Miscellaneous Utah
cities and towns

Hughes et
a1. 1978

Reference

Supply increase - drilled
more wells
a. Time limitation for
outdoor use
b. Quantity limits
c. Price increases
d. Public eduction

Variable results (see
regression
analysis
section)

Sector:

-..I
-..I

Municipal/Domestic

Program Design
Reduce use: voluntary
demand conservation
program

Effectiveness
Fairly effective

Reduce use: pr1ce
increases
Damage reduction/recovery;
price increases to generate
revenues for maintenance
and repair

Revenues increased but
use reductions
were mixed.
Sharp
most effective
in short run

Constraints and
Side Effects
Decreased revenues
in face of rising
maintenance costs;
but one town increased revenue.
Drought impacts
tend to uncover or
exacerbate existing
problems

Local Initiatives
Program/System
Identifier
Reference
Sma 11 cit i e s ,
Howe et
Colorado
al. 1980

Metering improves
price responsiveness

Augment supply: shortterm exchange~ truck in
water, system repair,
wells
Reduce use: various
outdoor watering
restrictions

20 percent expected reduction
in withdrawal

Ft. Collins,
Colorado

Anderson
1980

Reduce use: mandatory
quantity restrictions

57% reduction
requirement
was not by
70% red uc t ion

Marin Munic.
Water District

Larkin
1978

Reduce use: mandatory
quantity restriction

30% needed
reduction was
met
Preserved
quality of
intake at
acceptable
levels

Damage reduction/recovery:
change point of withdrawal
to hgher quality location

Salinity problems
Organizational
cooperation allowing use of canal
for conveyance

Larkin
1978

Sector:

Municipal/Domestic

Local Initiatives

Program Design

Effectiveness

Reduce use: mandatory
use reduction of 25%

57% reduction

Augment supply:
F .............

Y'Y"O

~t- " ..........

purchase

Constraints and
Side Ef fec t s

Program/System
Identifier

Reference

San Francisco
Water Dept.,
Calif.

Larkin
1978

East Bay Municipal
Utility Dept.,
Calif.

Larkin
1978

Organization and
r!l,...il;r;Ac t-n

T/'<"\"'~""

L~dLLVLdL~

OUppLL~O

over large area
Reduce use: mandatory
35% use reduction

""-J

00

47% reduction
Organizational cooperation

Augment supply: accelerate
development underway; move
point of diversion of
supplemental supply
Augment supply: purchase
from state water

Satisfactory

Organization cooperation to
secure release of
water and interconnect systems

Marin Municipal
Water District

Larkin
1978

Reduce use: install
meters and flow restrictors
on faucets,
ing
pr1ce

33% reduction
in household
use in hypothetical
western urban
system

Reductions in
return flows,
revenue losses from
reduced use more
than offset by
revenue increase
from price hike

Hypothetical

Flack 1981

Sector:

Municipal/Domestic

Program Design

State Initiatives

Effect iveness

Reduce use. augment supply
Damage reduction and recovery: public information
program. technical assistance

-...I

~

qonstraints and
Side Ef fec t s

Program/System
Identifier

Late implementation
Too much effort
directed long-term
actions, not immediate impacts.

Colorado

Howe et al.
1980

Hughes et
a1. 1978

Emergency grants for
facilities (mostly wells
to increase water supply)

33 systems
were granted
$855.000

Governor's
Culinary Grant
Fund

Revolving Fund with subsidized loans for
•
•
renovat~on-expans~on of
municipal systems

$1,000,000
added to this
on-going revolving fund
program

Cities Water
Loand Fund

Most increased
water production capacity
was not usable during
the drought

Reference

Sector:

Municipal/Domestic

Program Design

Federal Initiatives

Effectiveness

Constraints and
Side Effects.

Program/System
Ident i Her

Reference

Augment supply: grants and
loans to drought impacted
water systems with population > 10,000

$175 million on
268 projects,
most in west
questionable
results

Late implementation
inadequate standards
for determining
project worthiness,
inadequate coordination with other
programs

Economic Development Administration
Community Emergency
Drought Relief
Program

Comptroller
General of
the United
St ates 1979

Augment supply: grants and
loans to drought impacted
water systems with population < 10,000

$224 million
on 595 projects
questionable
results

Same as above

Farmers Home Administration:
Community Program Loans and
Grants

Comptroller
General of
the United
States 1979

Late implementation
Tended not to be
immediate drought
related, but
rewarded poorly
managed systems

FmHA and EDA/
Colorado

Howe et al.
1980

co
o

Damage reduction/recovery
Augment supply: FmHA and
EDA loans

Sector:

Local Initiatives

Agriculture

Program Design

Effectiveness

Allocation of water to
fewer acres, lining of
ditches, supply termination
to junior water right
owners

Some areas actually increased
yields due to better soil
planted and ideal summer
rains; but many areas
suffered large losses in
both annual and som~
perennial crops

Construction of wells and
reservoirs to increase
supply

Too late for help during
1977 but should produce
future benefits

Accelerated sale of
stock due to inadequate
range condition

Number of beef cattle were
reduced by 50 percent in
two counties - including
some breeding stock

Program/System
Ident i fier

Reference

Irrigation companies,
districts, and individual farms in
Utah

Hughes et
al. 1978

Stockmen in Utah

Hughes et
al. 1978

00

......

Sector:

Agriculture

Program Design

Local Initiatives

Effec t ivenes s

Constraints and
Side Effects

Augment supply: installation
of irr
tion systems/dry
land conversion
Augment supply: well drilling, increased·groundwater
use

00
N

Declining water
tables, increased
pumping costs,
subsidence

Program/System
Identifier

Reference

Georgia, South
Dakota

Matthai
1979

South Dakota,
Nebraska, Utah.
Kansas, Nevada,
Idaho, Oregon,
California,
Georgia

Matthai
1979

Reduce use: plant later,
reduce acreage, plant
crops with lower water
requirements

Matthai
1979

Reduce use: divert winter
use to storage, crop reductions, increased
application monitoring,
reduce conveyance loss

In some cases,
more careful
application
reduced use
and improved
yields

Augment supply: well drilling, trucking in water for
domestic supply and stock,
temporary exchanges and
rentals, cloud seeding

Ef fie ient short
term allocation
should result
from unimpeded
rental market,
unless return
flows are important

Highly developed
basins performed
much better where
cooperative
attitudes were
widespread

Colorado

Howe et al.
1980

Sector:

Agriculture

Program Design

00

w,

State Initiatives

Effectiveness

Program/System
Identifier

No interest loans to
irrigation companies

Fund was increased by $3.5
million

Revolving Construction
Fund

No interest loans to
stockmen

$2 million appropriated
(not all used)

Stockwater Loan Program

Increase in normal cloud
seeding program

$300,000 illocated but
$100,000 returned (few
clouds to seed)

Emergency Cloud Seeding
Program

Public education on drought
condition and conservation
techniques
Tanks and vehic les
acquired on loan basis
mostly from military

Drought Information
Center
689 portable tanks were
placed in use (saved
much of breeding stock)

Stockwater Hauling
Program

Reference
Hughes et
a1. 1978

Sector:

Agriculture

Program Design
Reduce use, augment supply
Damage reduction and recovery: public information
program, technical assistance

00

+"

State Initiatives

Effect iveness

Constraints and
Side Ef fect s

Program/System
Ident ifier

Reference

Late implementation
Too much effort
directed long-term
actions, not immediate impacts.

Colorado

Howe et al.
1980

Sector:

Agriculture

Program Design
Grants of 80 percent of cost
for water conservation and
development projects

Federal Initiat
Program/System
Ident ifier

Effectiveness

$11.8 million to 6,000
farmers in Utah)

s

Reference

ASCS-Emergency Conservation
Measures Program

Hughes et
a1. 1978

Total in Multistate
Drought Region = $100
million

00
V1

Up to 50 percent of eligible
livestock feed cost provided
as a grant

$5.1 million provided to
Utah farmers

ASCS Emergency Feed Program

Hughes et
a1. 1978

Emergency low interest loans
to cover losses to farmers

$100 million

Farmers Home Administration
(FmHA) Emergency Loan
Program

Hughes et
al. 1978

Loan and grant program for
short term water supply
assistance to communities
under 10,000 population

$150 and $75 million in loans
and grants respectively

FmHA-Community Facilities
Program

Hughes et
al. 1978

Federal crop insurance
(FCIC) program

$50 million increase in
FCIC capital stock

Federal Crop Insurance
Corp.

Hughes et
al. 1978

5 percent loans for water
supply and conservation
measures and establishing
a water bank for reallocation of water

$100 million

Bureau of Reclamation
Drought Emergency Program

Hughes et
a1. 1978

Emergency irrigation loans

$30 million

Bureau of Reclamation
Emergency Fund

Hughes et
a1. 1978

,Purchase of emergency power
supplies

$13.8 million

Southwestern Power Administration Community
Drought Relief

Hughes et
al.1978

Loans and grants for short
term water supply assistance to communities over
10,000 population

$175 million loans
grants

Economic Development
Administration Cummunity
Drought Relief

Hughes et
a1. 1978

~nd

Sector:

00'

Federal Initiatives

Agriculture
Constraints and
Side Effects
Legal uncertainties
for buyers and sellers. Incomplete
jurisdiction over
water rights.
Physical capacity
to transfer.

Program/System
Identifier
Bureau of Reclamation, Emergency Act
of 1977, California

Late implementation
Inadequate standards
for determining project worthiness/
relation to drought
Inadequate coordination with other
programs
Insufficient administrative
capacity

U. S. Bureau of
Reclamation:
Emergency Drought
Act of 1977

Comptroller
General of
the United
States 1979

$3,025 million
for 92,601 loans
Uncertain results

Inadequate coordination with other
programs

Farmers Home
Administration
Consolidated
Farm and Rural
Development Act
Emergency Loans

Comptroller
General of
the United
States 1979

Damage reduction/recovery:
loans to business, farmers,
nonprofit organizations for
damage repair, current
facilities, and working
capital

$1,556 million
for 40.601
loans (not all
drought related)
Some que st ionab Ie resul t s

Late implementation
Inadequate standards
for determining project worthiness. Inadequate coordination
with other programs

Small Business
Administration:
Small Business
Act disaster loans

Comptroller
General of
the United
States 1979

Damage reduction/recovery:
FmHA and SBA loans

Little shortterm effect

Late implementation
Early termination/
inadequate follow-up
Funds not directed
to immediate drought
effects. Gran,t process too complex

Program Design
Damage reduction/recovery:
USBR nonprofit brokerage in
California

Effectiveness
Not successful

Damage reduction/recovery:
implement water bank to shift
surplus and annual crop water
to higher value uses

$74 millon on
493 projects,
most in Far
West

Augment supply: permit
projects to develop new
sources, increase utilization of existing facilities

Questionable
results claims
moderate success for water
bank in California

Damage reduction/recovery:
loans to farmers for repairs,
crop losses, and working
capital

~

EDA and FmHA/
Colorado

Reference
Robie 1978

Howe et al.
1980

Sector:

Wastewater

Program Design
Reduce use: public information programs on conservation techniques. price
increases. and use
restrictions

0::>
-..J

Effec t iveness
20-60% use reduc tions.
Wastewater
flows decreased
an average 18%
in 14 Calif.
communities

Constraints and
Side Ef fec t s

Program/System
Ident ifier

Reference

Sharp. unanticipated
waste flow reductions increase
wastewater system
operating costs and
reduce operating
efficiency by:
accumulation of
sediment. hydrogen
sulfide formation,
and clogging in
collector system;
shock loads of" grit.
odor problems. ineffective solids removal. high concentration wastes in
treatment facilities.
Planned conservation
(with design changes)
could lead to lower
costs for collection
and treatment.

Colorado

Howe et al.

